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Abstract 
This thesis addresses issues that do not have a clear cut consensus in the economics of 
education literature. 
We begin by trying to identify regions of returns to schooling in the UK using an approach 
developed in Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000). Non-parametric bound analysis 
has the advantage to rely on relatively weak and somewhat testable assumptions. Applying 
this approach on two different large data sets we establish an identification region for the 
return to education and compare the results with some traditional parametric approaches 
commonly employed in the literature. The estimates show that the returns to education 
computed through weaker assumptions are smaller than (and in some cases well below) some 
of the point estimates usually reported in the literature.  
In the second part of this study, we investigate the effects of a funding education reform 
implemented in Brazil in 1998 (FUNDEF/FUNDEB), which largely increased educational 
expenditures across the country. The identification strategy comes from the fact that the 
exposure and intensity of the reform varied across municipalities and years.  First, we analyse 
whether the redistributive effect of the reform reduce inequality in terms of schools resources 
between poor and rich regions. Second, we verify whether an increase in the availability of 
resources to schools brought by the reform translated into higher students’ performance. The 
results suggest a decrease in the inequality of school resources within and to some extent 
across regions. However, there is no evidence of effects on students’ test scores. We also 
assess the effects of the funding reform on somewhat long term student´s outcomes. The 
results suggest that the reform leads to an increase in education attainment for individuals 
who went to schools in the most affected regions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
According to Barro (1996), economic growth rate is positively related to schooling. In 
the OECD area, one additional year of education is estimated to increase economic output by 
3 to 6% (OECD, 2005). Improving educational achievement is a policy priority in most 
countries, with policymakers looking for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the education 
system.  
As pointed out by Card (1999), education plays a central role in modern labour 
markets. However, despite the extensive availability of data on individual’s schooling and 
income, the literature has not yet reach a consensus on the magnitude of the causal effect of 
education on earnings. In fact the literature reveals a large range of estimates (Blundell et al, 
2005). Besides, some studies - Belzil and Hansen (2002) and Manski and Pepper (2000) – 
have casted doubt on the validity of most results reported in the empirical literature of returns 
to education. The crucial critic is that these estimates usually rely on stronger and 
questionable assumptions. Generally assuming a linear and homogenous relationship between 
wages and schooling and in some cases an exogenous treatment selection, which states that 
schooling is unrelated to unobserved factors affecting wages  
Therefore, the objective of the second chapter of this study is to identify regions of 
returns to schooling in the UK using a different approach. We use a methodology developed 
in Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000) and used, in the context of returns to 
education, in Okumura and Usiu (2010) and Giustinelli (2011). Non-parametric bound 
analysis has the advantage to rely on relatively weak and somewhat testable assumptions. By 
applying this approach to two large British data sets - the National Child Development Survey 
(NCDS) and the General Household Survey (GHS) -, we intend to establish an identification 
region for the return to education. The analysis benefits not only from the vast information on 
education in each survey but also from the comparison of the results among data sets and with 
estimates obtained using conventional methods.  
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the quantity of schooling.1 Studies that 
focused on the economic returns to different levels of school attainment have shown that more 
schooling is associated with higher individual earnings. However, besides expanding school 
                                                          
1 Card (1999), Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2000). 
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attainment, the quality of education is also an important input. Barro (2002) shows that 
besides the quantity of schooling - measured by average years of schooling attainment - the 
quality of schooling - measured by test scores - also have a particularly positive relation with 
economic growth. Hanushek and Wößmann (2007) also shows that there is strong evidence 
that the cognitive skills of the population are related to individual earnings and economic 
growth.  
Despite the significant increase in spending per per pupil over the past decade, many 
countries have not been able to improve the quality of learning outcomes (OECD, 2010). The 
development of educational systems towards access improvement, quality enhancement and 
increase performance in a cost-effective way is not a simple task. Governments must establish 
which policy choices promote efficient learning by taking into consideration their countries’ 
specific contexts and realities. 
In the last decades, the investment in education in Brazil has largely focused on 
increasing primary and secondary school enrolment rates, with the final goal of increasing the 
levels of education achievement. More recently, however, the quality of education has 
become a serious concern. One could argue that the development of cognitive abilities 
provided by the educational process depends both on the quantity and on the quality of the 
educational inputs received.  
Too little is known about how effective public expenditures on education are at 
increasing pupil’s performance and attainment. There is a large and controversial literature 
analysing the relationship between education expenditures and student’s achievement, both in 
developing and developed countries (Glewwe et. al (2011), Hanushek (2006), Hanushek and 
Wößmann (2011), Gibbons et. all (2012), Holmlund et. all (2011)). The key question, 
therefore, is whether higher spending translates into student achievements. Identifying the 
effects of a higher per pupil spending on students’ education performance is crucial since it is 
directly related to the formulation of efficient public policies within the realm of limited 
resources.  
In 1998, Brazil implemented and education funding reform called FUNDEF (Fundo de 
Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magistério). The 
reform only incorporated primary education at first. In 2007, the policy continued under the 
name FUNDEB (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da Educação Básica e de 
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Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação) and incorporated other levels of the educational 
system, such as the pre-school education and the secondary education. The reform changed 
the structure of public education funding and lead to a large increase on spending per pupil. 
One of the major goals of the FUNDEF/FUNDEB reform was to reduce the large funding 
disparities across the country, with the ultimate goal of reducing inequalities in terms of 
students’ achievements. The reform also aims at improving school quality by improving 
school inputs. The program is one of the major educational reforms implemented in the 
country. After the implementation of the FUNDEF, Brazil experienced a large increase in its 
educational expenditures.  
Thus, in the third chapter we analyse the effects of FUNDEF reform on school inputs 
and students´ outcomes.  First, we analyse whether the redistributive effect of the Brazilian 
educational reform reduced inequality in terms of schools resources between poor and rich 
regions. We also verify whether the increase in the availability of resources to schools 
brought by the reform translated into higher students’ performance. The regional approach, 
not yet explored, should be the subject of an extensive discussion since education disparities 
is one of the major causes of the large income inequalities across the country (Reis and Paes 
de Barros (1990). The measurement of the reform effects across largely different regions is 
crucial to identify the policy strengths and weaknesses when applied in different local 
realities. Another import aspect of the reform is its long term effect. We also evaluate the 
effects of the reform on somewhat longer term outcomes such as the probability to complete 
educational cycles and completed years of schooling. The identification strategy comes from 
the fact that the exposure and intensity of the reform varied across municipalities and years. 
We thus explore this variation across space and time to estimate the policy effects on 
education attainment. As far as we are aware, the majority studies so far have mainly focused 
on FUNDEB short-term effects. This study, therefore, aims at covering this gap in the 
literature.  
The thesis is organized as follow. Apart from this introduction, chapter 2 tries to 
establish an identification region for the return to education in the UK using Manski (1997) 
and Manski and Pepper (2000) non-parametric bounds. Chapter 3 evaluates the effects of an 
educational funding reform implemented in Brazil on several school inputs. We also assess 
whether an increase in the availability of resources to schools brought by the reform translated 
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into higher students’ performance. Lastly, the impact of the reform on somewhat long term 
effects are also estimated. Chapter 4 concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2. Leaps and Bounds: What can we Learn about the Rate of Return to 
Education in the UK from Partial Identification? 
 2.1. Introduction 
 According to Becker (1964) the most important determinant of the amount invested in 
human capital is its profitability or rate of return; i.e. individuals invest in their own education 
in order to capture these returns. As such a great amount of research has focused on 
estimating the returns to education. However, despite extensive availability of data on 
individual’s schooling and income the literature reveals a large range of estimates (Blundell et 
al, 2005). Besides, some studies - Belzil and Hansen (2002), Okumura and Usui (2010) and 
Manski and Pepper (2000) – have casted doubt on the validity of most results reported in the 
empirical literature of returns to education, and advocated estimating regions of returns rather 
than point estimates.  
   The literature on returns to education is largely based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) and attempt to identify point estimates of the returns. To do so it assumes a linear and 
homogenous relationship between the response function and the treatment variable, i.e., that 
all individuals in the population experience the same return per year of schooling and that 
each additional year of schooling has the same marginal return.2 In addition, it assumes 
exogenous treatment selection which states that schooling are unrelated to unobserved factors 
affecting wages. While it is possible to relax this assumption by relying on instrumental 
variables, regression discontinuity or family fixed effects (twin), these methods all impose 
additional identifying assumptions, we instead identify bounds in which return to education 
lies. We use an approach developed in Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000). The 
crucial idea of non-parametric bounds is that, instead of obtaining points estimates, which 
usually relies on stronger and questionable assumptions, the method calculates bounds for the 
treatment effects based on weaker and more credible hypothesis. 
Non-parametric bounds on partially identified parameters were first introduced by 
Manski (1990) and further developed in Manski (1995, 1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000). 
Manski and Pepper (2000) and Okumura and Usiu (2010) applied bounds on returns to 
                                                          
2 In the multiple-treatment model different schooling levels are allowed to have different effects on wages even 
though the returns to a given level are homogenous across individuals. 
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schooling from a sample taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) for 
the U.S. Some of their estimated upper bonds are lower than the point estimates reported in 
the literature. The authors found that the difference on the returns to schooling between high 
school and college is at most 0.257. Thus, the yearly average treatment effect is at most 0.064, 
which falls in the lower range of the point estimates on the returns to schooling reported by 
Card (1999) for the U.S (0.052 to 0.132), which Manski and Pepper (2000) interpret as 
indication of misspecification of the parametric model (e.g. due to the linearity assumptions). 
This chapter implements non-parametric bounds to estimate returns to education in the UK. 
We compute estimates for two large British data sets, and compare them with some 
parametric estimates. 
Non-parametric bounds, however, also present some drawbacks. Firstly, bounds can 
be very large and uninformative unless more assumptions are imposed. Secondly, the 
literature for partially identified parameter has not yet reached a formal consensus on which 
method yields the most credible confidence interval for the bound estimates. Thirdly, the 
validity of the assumptions can also be questioned.   
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2, we review the econometrics behind 
the various estimation strategy commonly used to estimate returns to education.  Section 2.3 
presents the literature review. Empirical results are shown is section 2.4. Section 2.5 
compares non-parametric bounds to the results using other identification approaches. Section 
2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Some Parametric Approaches 
The causal relation between schooling and earnings can be defined as the relation 
which describes what would be a given individual earnings if he or she obtained certain levels 
of education. In our setting, the realized outcome  iii SYY   is the level of earnings for an 
individual i who receives treatment iS , i.e iS  represents the realized years of schooling, both 
of which are observed. 
 To begin with suppose schooling is a binary decision like go or not to college. To 
describe the problem more precisely, the treatment status is described by a binary random 
variable, )1,0(iS . The treated individuals are the ones who actually choose to go 
college, 1iS , and the control group are the ones who choose not to go, 0iS . Let iY1  be 
17 
 
the potential outcome for individual i if 1iS , and iY0 , the potential outcome for i if 0iS . 
The observed outcome, iY , can be written in terms of potential outcomes as: 
iiiii SYYYY )( 010                          (1) 
Comparing the average outcome of those who were and were not treated, we get: 
       
   0|1|
1|1|0|1|
00
01


iiii
iiiiiiii
SYESYE
SYESYESYESYE
                   (2) 
where the first term on the right hand side is called the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT).  
 The problem is that the counterfactual outcome of an individual under treatment 
 1|0 ii SYE   cannot be observed, since an individual may only be observed as having gone 
or not gone to college, but not in both states at a specific point in time. One way to compute 
the ATT is to replace the average outcome of the treated individuals if they would have not 
been treated, with the average results of the individuals who had not been treated 
 0|0 ii SYE . However replacing the unobserved earnings of the treated by the observed 
earnings of the non-treated introduce some bias, since it is unlikely 
that    0|1| 00  iiii SYESYE . The bias arises due to differences in the observable and 
unobservable attributes between treatment and control groups; i.e. individual who chose to go 
to college are different from those who decided not to go, and those differences are correlated 
with their earning potentials. For example, more motivated individuals are more likely both to 
go to college and to earn higher wages.  
 The bias problem disappears with random assignment of the individuals between 
groups. If we could allocate individuals' schooling randomly, those with different levels of 
schooling would be on average identical. Random assignment of iS  solves the selection 
problem as it makes iS  independent of potential outcomes. The independence of iY0  of iS  
makes    0|1| 00  iiii SYESYE ; i.e. the selection bias disappears.  
If the selection process in turn is based on observable characteristics the selection bias 
can also disappears. Conditioning on X, a vector of observable variables, ATT can now be 
rewrite as: 
18 
 
     XSYEXSYEXSYYE iiiiiii ,1|,1|,1| 0101                                (3) 
which means that 
 iiii XSYY |, 10    0,|1,| 010  iiiii SXYESXYE                                                      (4) 
iS  is now independent of potential earnings given the observable characteristics X – this is 
known as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The CIA asserts that conditional 
on observed characteristics the selection bias disappears, so comparisons of average earnings 
across schooling levels have a causal interpretation.  
We might be interested not only on the ATT,  1|01  iii SYYE , but also on the 
average treatment effect (ATE),  ii YYE 01  . The average causal effect of a one year increase 
in schooling given CIA is: 
     iiiiiiiii XsYsYEsSXYEsSXYE |)1()(1,|,|                    (5) 
In the absence of an experiment, researchers rely on a variety of econometrics 
strategies to deal with the selection bias. Some of the statistical techniques employed in the 
context of returns to schooling include regression, matching, instrumental variables, 
regression discontinuity, family fixed effects (twins). Some of the statistical techniques 
Consider the following equation:  
iiiii XSY                          (6) 
This regression presents a linear relationship between years of schooling and earnings and a 
constant return to education, hypothesis commonly imposed in the literature. Given that CIA 
holds for the vector of observed covariates, iX , the regression coefficient   is the causal 
effect of interest. The key assumption here is that the observable characteristics, iX , are the 
only reason why i  and iS  are correlated. This is similar to the exogenous treatment selection 
(ETS) assumption commonly imposed on OLS. On that case given X, the selection into 
treatment is exogenous and schooling is unrelated to unobserved factors affecting wages. 
Matching in turn, estimate the treatment effects by comparing (matching) individuals 
with the same covariates. Under the matching assumption, all the relevant differences 
between treated and non-treated individuals are captured by their observable characteristics. 
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So according to the selection on observables assumption the outcomes are independent from 
the treatment given the observed attributes. Like regression, matching also assumes the CIA 
assumption . Unlike regression though matching does not impose linearity or a homogeneous 
additive treatment effect, but both methods depend heavily on the crucial assumption of the 
selection on observables.   
The CIA required for regression and matching to identify treatment effects is a 
somewhat strong hypothesis as many of the necessary control variables are typically 
unmeasured or simply unknown. Instrumental Variable regressions (IV) methods yield robust 
estimations when the assumption of selection on observable is rejected. 
If iS  is correlated with i , regression estimates of (6) do not estimate   consistently. 
Now suppose there exist a variable iZ , which is correlated with iS , but unrelated to iY . It 
therefore follows that  
  0iiZCov                                                                      (7)  
which is called the exclusion restriction since iZ  can be said to be excluded from the causal 
model of interest. A variable iZ  is an instrument for the causal effect of iS  on iY if it is 
correlated with the endogenous variables iS  and does no appear as a regressor in the model 
for iY . In the returns to education literature several instruments have been used as.  
In the literature on returns to education, the instruments used vary from changes in 
compulsory schooling laws, to variation in tuition fees, birth order, distance to college and 
others.3 Whether an IV approach can be used to identify the causal effect of years of 
schooling on earnings depends on the strength and validity of the instruments employed. 
Weak instruments, that is, instruments that are only weakly correlated with the included 
endogenous variables, tend to produce biased results even in large samples (Baker et al, 
1995). Another potential problem is that different instruments estimate different local average 
treatment effects (LATE) and not the average treatment effect for the population. LATE will 
typically vary depending on which instrument is used; i.e. different instruments rely on 
subpopulations that might have different characteristics from the overall population. These 
                                                          
3 Card (1999). 
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estimates will only estimate the average treatment effect if the earnings schooling function is 
linear and homogeneous.  
An alternative identifying strategy is to rely on dataset containing twins.4 This method 
deals with selection bias by applying the so called within-twin pair estimator; i.e. it assumes 
that unobservable characteristics of identical twins are identical, and thus get eliminated with 
differentiating within twin pair. Returns to schooling are estimate comparing the difference in 
twins´ education with the difference in their earnings. However whilst within-pair 
differencing removes some of the bias, there might be other differences between twins that are 
unobservable to the researcher and that affect both schooling decision and wages. 
fffff ASY 11111                        (8) 
fffff ASY 22222                        (9) 
where fY1  is earnings for the first twin in family f and fA1  is all the other effects on 
wages apart from schooling. 
A within-twin pair estimator for identical twins is given by: 
)()()( 21212121 ffffffff AASSYY                                                   (10) 
The assumption implied to get unbiased estimates with this strategy is that the 
difference in schooling between twins is random.  
Regression discontinuities designs (RDD) have also been employed on the estimates 
of returns to education.5 This method exploits discontinuity in rules that determine the 
treatment status, for example base on birth dates, some individuals are affected by a schooling 
reforms and others are not. There are two types of RDD designs, the so called fuzzy and sharp 
designs.  
Consider the following example: 
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4 Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994); Bonjour et. all (2003), Miller et. all (1995). 
55 Devereux and Hart (2010), Grenet (2009). 
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The treatment status, iS , is a deterministic and discontinuous function of a covariate, 
ix . It is a deterministic function because the value of iS  is based on the ix  values and a 
discontinuous function because treatment changes exactly on the point where ix = 0x . The 
sharp design can also be thought as a selection-on-observables approach, but it assumes that 
close to the discontinuity the populations are identical.  
The fuzzy design in turn can be seen more like an IV approach. Fuzzy RD exploits 
discontinuities in the probability of treatment conditional on a covariate, ix .The discontinuity 
becomes an instrumental variable for the treatment status.  
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Unlike the sharp design the probability of receiving the treatment needs not to change 
from zero to one at 0x  . Instead, it allows for a smaller jump in the probability of treatment at 
the threshold. The functions )(0 ixf  and )( ii xf  should differ at 0x . 
The contribution of the present chapter, therefore, is to use a different approach to 
estimate the causal effect of individual’s years of schooling on wages. In order to recover this 
estimate, we apply a nonparametric bound analysis developed in Manski (1997) and Manski 
and Pepper (2000) which we describe later.  
2.3 Partial Identification Bounds: Empirical Framework 
In our setting, the realized outcome  jjj syy   is the level of earnings for an 
individual who receives treatment js , i.e js is realized years of schooling, both of which are 
observed. We are interested in learning about the mean treatment response  E y    and also 
the average treatment effects          j jE y s E y t  for jjjj tsTts  ,, , of years of schooling 
on wages.  The selection problem arises as one cannot observe what would have been the 
counterfactual individual’s wage if he or she would have experienced jt  years of schooling. 
To simplify notation, the subscript j will be dropped in what follows.  
The identification problem can be shown below:  
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 Decomposing  E y    by the law of total probability: 
                        | |E y t E y t s t P s t E y t s t P s t                                          (11) 
The sampling process identifies    |E y t s t ,  P s t and  P s t , but it is uninformative 
about    |E y t s t . Some assumption have to be imposed in order to get identification.  
According to Manski (1997), a leading theme in the analysis of treatment response has been 
to impose strong assumptions in order to identify features of the unknown distribution of the 
response function or, perhaps, the conditional distributions, which sacrifices credibility in 
order to achieve strong conclusions. Manski advocates weaker assumptions.   
We start with the no-assumption bound, which impose no assumptions at all, and then 
we move to the introduction of weak but credible assumptions in order to identify regions for 
the treatment effect.  
2.3.1 The No-assumption Bounds 
According to Manski (1989) it is possible to identify bounds on    E y t without 
having to impose any assumptions if the support of the dependent variable is bounded.  This 
is true for our log hourly wage which is bounded within the interval  min max,y y , where miny  is 
the lowest value of observed log wages and maxy  its highest level. Then identification region 
for the mean treatment effect is the interval equation: 
                            min max( )| |E y t s t P s t y P s t E y t E y t s t P s t y P s t              (12) 
This bound has width equal to max min( )y y  P s t , so the larger the probability that tz  , 
the larger is the bound interval and the less precise is the information one obtains about the 
parameter of interest. These bounds can, therefore, be very wide, and in that sense they are 
not so informative. 
2.3.2 Identification Assumptions 
In order to improve the no-assumptions bounds we follow Manski and Pepper (2000) 
and impose some assumptions to narrow the width of the intervals of the unknown parameter 
of interest. 
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2.3.2.1 Monotone Treatment Response (MTR) 
Rather than assuming a linear response assumption, a monotone response assumption 
is assumed, which presume that our response variable varies monotonically with treatment. 
Monotone Treatment Response Assumption: Let T  be an ordered set such as: 
     2 1 2 1t t y t y t                                                                                                (13)  
This assumption asserts that the response varies monotonically with treatment. In other 
words, increasing years of schooling weakly increases wages.  
By combining the MTR assumption with the no-assumptions bounds above, we get 
MTR bounds: 
          
         
 
         
      
   
      
min
max
| |
| |
E y s t P s t E y s t P s t y P s t
E y t
E y s t P s t E y s t P s t y P s t
                                 (14) 
This weak assumption can narrow the no-assumption bounds, since for the group with (s < t) 
under the MTR assumption, their observed mean wage is less than or equal to what their 
mean wage would have been if they had schooling level t. So one can use observed mean 
wage to tighten the lower bound. For the group with (s > t) the MTR assumption implies that 
if they would have had schooling level t, their mean wage would have been lower than or 
equal to their current mean wage. So the observed mean wage is used to tighten the upper 
bound. 
2.3.2.2 Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS) 
To thighten the bounds further, additional assumptions can be imposed.  
Assuming Monotone Treatment Selection: Let T  be an ordered set. 
             2 1 2 1| |t t E y t s t E y t s t                                                                  (15) 
The MTS assumption implies that individuals with higher years of schooling have 
weakly higher mean wage functions than those with lower levels of schooling. In other words, 
at any education level, more able individuals would be rewarded better than less able 
individuals. Therefore, instead of assuming exogenous selection into treatment, we assume a 
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positive selection into it. Through MTS, we incorporate the possibility that years of schooling 
could be related to individual’s ability.  Manski and Pepper (2000) showed that combining 
MTR and MTS assumptions yields a sharp bound on the treatment effect.  
By combining the MTR and the MTS assumptions, we get the MTR-MTS bounds:6 
           
           
 
           
       
   
       
| | |
| | |
E y s t P s t E y s t P s t E y s t P z t
E y t
E y s t P s t E y s t P s t E y s t P s t
                      (16) 
The validity of the MTS and MTR assumptions could also be questioned, since it 
considers that the level of schooling determines future earnings and, that individuals with 
higher ability choose higher levels of schooling and have higher wagesNote, however, that 
both assumptions consider weak inequalities. Therefore, if the expected future earning is 
higher for 1t  years of schooling (and if 2 1t t ), individuals with higher ability could select 1t  
years of schooling which might invalidate the monotonicity assumption. Nevertheless, we can 
also check its validity through the data. 
So under the MTR-MTS assumption, the mean individual’s wage should be weakly 
increasing in the realized years of schooling. That hypothesis must be met in order for the 
MTR-MTS assumption to be satisfied. 
According to Manski and Peper (2000), MTR and MTS assumptions are consistent 
with human capital theory:  
“The MTS assumption is consistent with economic models of schooling choice 
and wage determinations which predict that persons with higher ability have 
higher mean wage functions and choose higher level of schooling than do 
person with lower ability.…Human capital theory suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, the wage that a worker earns weakly increases as a functions of the 
worker`s years of schooling. In this and other settings, MTR assumption has a 
reasonably firm foundation” (Manski and Pepper, p. 1002, 2000) 
 
                                                          
6 For the full derivation of the bounds, see Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000). 
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Chevalier and Lanot (2004) however show that the monotonicity assumptions 
assumed by Manski are in general not compatible with the decision process assumed by Roy 
(1951) model. The MTS assumption states that more able individuals who choose higher 
levels of education would have, on average, higher mean wage functions if they were, 
otherwise, reassigned to lower education level. The Roy model, on the other hand, does not 
impose such a requirement on the latent earnings distribution; it only requires that individuals 
decide based on the highest return. 
2.3.2.3 Monotone Instrumental Variable (MIV) 
Manski and Pepper (2000) propose the use of a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) 
instead of an IV. Consider the instrumental variable z which satisfies the mean-independence 
assumption: 
                 2 1| |E y t z u E y t z u , 21 uu                                                                   (17) 
This assumption asserts that mean response is constant across the population of 
interest. The MIV assumption, on the other hand, assumes that the mean wage response 
varies weakly monotonically across specified subpopulations: 
             2 1 2 1| |u u E y t z u E y t z u                                                               (18) 
Therefore, instead of assuming mean independence, the MIV assumption allows for a 
weakly monotone relation between the instrumental variable and the mean wage function. 
Note that the MTS is a special case of MIV when the instrumental variable coincides with the 
treatment. 
     2.3.2.4 MTR&MTS and MIV 
We also combine the MIV assumption with the MTR and MTS assumptions in order to 
further tighten the bounds on  E y t    and on the average treatment 
effect    E y t E y s       .
7  
Under MTR, MTS, MIV, the bounds on  E y t    are given by:  
                                                          
7 For full derivation of these bounds see Manski and Pepper (2000). 
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                                                                         (19) 
The MTR/MTS/MIV bounds are computed in the following way: the sample is 
divided into subsamples on the basis of z, with the MTR/MTS bounds being computed for 
each subsample. For the subsample in which z has the value u, we obtain a lower bound, 
which is the largest lower bound over all the subsamples where z is lower than or equal to u. 
Similarly, we can obtain an upper bound by taking the smallest upper bound over all 
subsamples with a value of z higher than or equal u. 
To obtain the lower and upper bounds, one can substitute the sample means and 
empirical probabilities in the equations (4), (10), and (13) and obtain the no-assumptions, 
MTR&MTS, and MTR&MTS&MIV bounds. Under the assumptions adopted, all bounds are 
consistent. However, as pointed out by Manski and Pepper (2000), the MIV bounds may have 
non-negligible ﬁnite-sample biases, since such bounds are obtained by taking maxima and 
minima over a range of nonparametric regression estimates. In order to overcome this issue, 
Kreider and Pepper (2007) propose a modified MIV estimator that takes into account the 
finite-sample bias using a nonparametric bootstrap correction. The bias is estimated as:  
^ ^
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  
 
  where k  is the estimate of the MIV bounds of the kth bootstrap 
replication and 
^
  is the initial estimate of MIV lower and upper bounds. 
The bias-corrected MIV bounds are then obtained as:  
^ ^ ^ ^
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  where 
^
bc is the estimate bias-corrected MIV bounds. 
2.4. Review of some Empirical Evidence for the UK 
Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2000), reviewed a number of studies which estimate 
the relationship between education and wages. According to the authors the OLS estimates 
suggests a return to a year of schooling between 7% and 9% for the UK when a relative 
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parsimonious specification is used. When increase in school leaving age is used as an 
instrument for education the estimates suggest a higher return to schooling, which ranges 
from 11% to 15%. 
Walker and Zhu (2001) give a review on a variety of studies on the relationship 
between education and wages. The vast majority of the estimates for men lie within the 4.1% 
to 10.8% range. For women the range is from 4.6% to 8.3%. Estimates using IV lies on the 
5.5% to 15.2% range for men and are around 9.3% for women, the instruments used were 
family background and SLA changes. There are still fewer consensuses on the returns to 
qualification across the studies. Estimates on the return of acquiring a college degree ranges 
from 26.4% to 71.2%. 
Blundell et al (2005) employed different parametric and non-parametric methods, in 
order to recover the effect of education on individual earnings. Using NCDS data -  a 
longitudinal cohort study of all people born in Britain in a given week in March 1958 data  - 
which allows them to control for ability and family background, the authors employed 
different estimation methods – OLS, IV, control functions methods and matching methods – 
which rely on different assumptions. The average return to O-level, A-levels and higher 
education compared with stopping at 16 years of age without qualification was 18%, 24% and 
48% respectively.  
  Harmon and Walker (1995) were the ﬁrst to use school-leaving age changes to 
estimate returns to schooling. The authors estimate men’s return to schooling for the UK 
using an IV approach which exploits two changes in the minimum school leaving age (SLA) 
(the first one increased the SLA from 14 to 15 in 1947 and a further increase in 1973 changes 
the SLA from 15 to 16). The IV approach yields an estimated return of over 15% while OLS 
estimate was about 6%. Their study was criticised by Oreopoulos (2006) since they do not 
adequately control for birth cohort effects. Also, because the later 1973 law change affected a 
much smaller proportion of the population.  
Oreopoulos (2006) using the General Household Survey (GHS) also exploits the first 
change in the minimum SLA in the UK. The author argued that as almost half of the 
population of 14 years old were affect by the new minimum age at the time, the estimate of 
the LATE should be close the average treatment effect. Comparing to LATE estimates from 
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USA, which also explores changes in minimum SLA, the author found a large gain from 
compulsory schooling – 10% to 14%.  
Focusing on the 1973 SLA in England and Wales and the 1967 SLA in France, Grenet 
(2009) implements a regression discontinuity design to estimate returns to education. Using 
the British Labour Force Survey the author estimates a return for men and women of 
approximately 6‐7 per cent and no impact for the French law. According to the author, the 
difference between the two reforms was that the portion of individuals with no qualifications 
severely dropped after the introduction of the new SLA in England and Wales, while it kept 
unchanged in France.  
Devereux and Hart (2010) likewise employed a regression discontinuity design 
allowing comparison of wages for the cohorts born just before and just after the 1947 SLA 
law change. Using the New Earnings Survey Panel Data-Set (NESPD) they found that the 
estimates are in fact small and much lower than OLS (around 4 to 7% for men and no 
evidence of a positive return for women). Grenet (2009) finds somewhat larger estimates 
since the 1973 SLA change increases the compulsory schooling age from 15 to 16 that also 
affects the probability of attaining academic credentials.  
Bonjour et al (2003) use a sample of twins to estimate returns to education.  Using a 
data set for identical female twins they exploit the difference in twins’ years of schooling as 
an instrument for education. The estimates suggest a private return to schooling for women of 
7.7 percent. Amin (2011), however, found that these results are driven by one twin pair, 
which is an outlier in the dataset.  If this twin pair is eliminated from the sample the estimated 
return to education drops to 5.1 percent. 
To sum up, it is worth comparing the estimated returns under alternative estimation 
methods. First, OLS is biased upwards since more able individuals tend to obtain more 
schooling. IV estimates based on family background variables usually yield high returns to 
schooling than OLS. These estimates though suffer from bias since background variables is 
also a proxy for ability and so directly affect wages and schooling.  IV estimates based on 
changes on compulsory schooling laws have usually exceeded OLS estimates since the group 
of individuals influenced by the law have particularly high returns to education. Those 
individuals who are induced to stay on at school because of the reform typically have very 
low levels of schooling. The IV estimator can exceed the convention OLS estimator if the 
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intervention affects a subgroup with a relatively high marginal return to schooling. The 
studies reviewed above based on regression discontinuity methods found a much smaller 
effect for returns to schooling than IV-SLA estimates. These could suggest that the large 
estimates found using compulsory schooling law changes were based on very high returns to 
schooling for a number of compliers.  
2.5. Results 
In this section we estimate rates of return based on qualifications using two different 
British data sets. We assume a multiple treatment framework distinguishing between discrete 
values of educational qualifications which are allowed to have different effects on earnings.  
We are interested not only on mean wages of a given amount of schooling but also in 
the difference between mean wages among two subsequent qualifications. Here, the main 
focus is on the average treatment effect (ATE): ( , ) [ ( )] [ ( )]s t E y t E y s   . To obtain bounds 
on the ATE, we subtract the lower (upper) bound on [ ( )]E y s  from the upper (lower) bound 
on [ ( )]E y t  to get the upper (lower) bound. As a single rate of return across lifetime does not 
seem very reasonable, we estimate bounds in different points in time allowing for 
heterogeneous returns to education over the life cycle. 
2.5.1 NCDS 
The British NCDS data is a continuing longitudinal survey of all children born in 
Britain between 3 and 9 of March in 1958. The data contain information on parents’ education 
and social class, mathematics and reading ability at ages 7 and 11, earnings, employment and 
training since leaving education. 
The surveys were undertaken in 1981, 1991, 1999/2000 and 2008/2009 and restricted 
to full time workers and not self-employed individuals, with the effects being analysed for 
men and women separately. Estimates were computed only for individuals aged 33 and 42 
due the small number of observations for individuals aged 23 and 50 especially in which 
regards MIV estimation.  
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The following based measures of education are adopted: no qualifications (or 
extremely low levels), O-level or vocational equivalent, A-levels or vocational equivalent and 
some type of higher education qualification (HE).8    
First, the following analysis compares the results of non-parametric bounds with the 
results of adopting an ETS assumption. This assumption, yields point identification and 
assumes that individual’s years of schooling are unrelated to unobserved factors affecting 
individuals’ wages (such as ability). A multiple treatment model is used instead of assuming a 
linear effect of schooling on wages. 
Table 2.1 presents the values for  |E y s  and the number of observations used to 
estimate the bounds for the NCDS for the sample of men at different ages.9 The table shows 
that the observed wages increase with the type of qualification for all ages, in line with the 
monotonicity hypothesis. 10  
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show that the data supports the validity of the quintiles of ability in 
the sense of an MIV. The mean wage function monotonically increases with ability quintiles 
for all ages and for both math and reading abilities. In order to compute MIV estimates the 
quintiles are aggregated in two groups: low ability (individuals in the lowest quintiles - 1 to 3) 
and high ability (individuals in the highest quintiles - 4, 5). Mean (log) wages and the number 
of observation in each group of ability are also present in tables 2.2 and 2.3. 
Figures 2.1 to 2.4 illustrate how the assumptions imposed can narrow the non-
parametric bounds. Figure 2.1 shows non-parametric bounds on mean log wages as a function 
of qualification levels, as well the ETS point estimates for men aged 42.11 The first panel 
shows the no-assumption bounds, which are quite wide. In the second panel, the MTR 
                                                          
8  O-levels are subject-based qualifications usually taken by 16 years old students in secondary education. A-
levels (advanced levels) are academic qualifications taken by students aged 18, completing secondary. A-levels 
are generally required for higher education entry. 
9 Hourly wages deflated by UK Retail Price Index. 
10One can informally test the MTR&MTS assumptions checking if the conditional expectation 
functions  E y are weakly increasing in t. If the joint assumption is rejected, if one is willing to assume that a 
higher qualification cannot decrease the individual wage (MTR), this implies that the assumption that is failing 
to hold is the one about selection (MTS). 
11 To allow comparability between years (ages), nominal wages were deflated using the annual Retail Price 
Index. 
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assumption is imposed.12 Despite of reducing the width of the bounds; they are still not very 
informative. The third panel shows the estimated bounds assuming MTR&MTS. The 
combined assumptions now strongly reduce the width of the bounds. For the lowest 
qualification levels (none and O-levels), the ETS point estimates almost coincide with the 
lower bound, whereas for the highest level (HE) the ETS almost coincides with the upper 
bound. The last panel adds the MIV assumption. To compute the bounds, we use the quintiles 
of math ability at age 11 as an MIV.13 We assume that people with higher quintiles of math 
ability have weakly higher mean wages functions. Adding this assumption tightens the 
bounds even further. Comparing MIV bounds with the ETS point estimates, one can note that 
for most of the qualifications levels the ETS results fall outside the bounds. Thus, ETS 
underestimates for the lowest qualification levels and overestimates for the highest level. 
Figure 2.2 in turn shows bounds on mean log wages for women aged 42. Again, the 
no-assumptions and MTR bounds are not very informative. On the third panel MTR&MTS 
assumptions now strongly reduce the width of the bounds. For the lowest qualification levels 
(None and O-levels), the ETS point estimates coincide with the lower bound, whereas for the 
HE estimate the ETS coincides with the upper bound. In the fourth panel bounds are 
estimated using quintiles of math ability at age 11 as an MIV.14 In the MTR&MTS&MIV 
bounds the ETS point estimates for None and A-levels coincides with the lower bound while 
the ETS point estimates for O-levels and HE falls outside the MIV bounds.  
So far we have computed bounds on [ ( )]E y t , but we are also interested on the 
average treatment effect: ( , ) [ ( )] [ ( )]s t E y t E y s   . Figure 2.3 and 2.4 shows the lower and 
upper bounds for the ATE while moving from A-level to HE for men and women aged 42. As 
before, the no-assumptions bound estimate is quite wide and not very informative. The figure 
shows how bounds narrow with the inclusion and combination of different assumptions. The 
MTR assumption reduces the no-assumption lower bound, as it implies that the lower bound 
cannot be lower than zero. For people with ( )t s t , the MTR assumption implies that if they 
would have had a level of schooling t, their mean wage would have been lower than or equal 
                                                          
12For the no-assumption and MTR bounds we have selected the minimum ( miny ) and the maximum levels 
( maxy ) for the (log) hourly wage in the NCDS data sets. Alternative values do not yield qualitatively different 
results. 
13 Using reading ability as an MIV yields very similar results.  
14 Using reading ability as an MIV yields very similar results.  
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to their current mean wage. This mean wage therefore is used to tighten the no-assumptions 
upper bound. The MTS assumption reduces the upper bound even further. The combination of 
these two assumptions additionally reduces the bound on ATE. Using the quintiles for math 
ability as an MIV reduces the ATE even further as in the [ ( )]E y t  case. One can also note that 
the bounds for moving from A-level to HE are greater for women, since returns to education 
for women are on average higher compared to men. Therefore, figures 2.1 to 2.4 clearly show 
how the assumptions imposed greatly narrow the no-assumption bounds.   
Tables 2.4 to 2.5 present bounds for the ATE at different ages assuming MTR&MTS 
and MTR&MTS&MIV, as well as ETS point estimates.15 Table 2.4 shows the estimates for 
men aged 42. The upper bounds on MTR&MTS are in most cases higher than the ETS point 
estimate. For the results on (O-level, HE) and (None, HE), the ETS point estimate almost 
coincides with the upper bound on the MTR&MTS. Using math and reading ability as an 
MIV yield upper bounds that are lower than the MTR&MTS bounds and also lower than the 
ETS point estimates, 
The MTR&MTS&MIV upper bound for moving from no education to O-levels 
narrows down to 0.16 using quintile of reading ability as an MIV, which is lower than the 
ETS point estimate of 0.25. The upper bound on return to schooling obtained by moving from 
O-level to A-level narrows down to approximately 0.10 when using quintiles of ability as an 
MIV. In the same fashion, the bounds on returns obtained by moving from A-levels to HE 
narrows down to 0.14, moreover the ETS point estimate fall outside the bias-corrected MIV 
confidence interval. Using math and reading ability as an MIV narrows down the upper 
bounds for (None, A-level) to 0.30 and 0.25 respectively, which are below the ETS point 
estimate of .43. The MTR&MTS&MIV estimates for (O-levels, HE) is point identified since 
the lower and upper bounds coincide16 While the ETS point estimate for moving from O-level 
                                                          
15 We compute Imbens and Manski (2004) proposed confidence intervals (CI). The CI is computed as: 
^ ^ ^ ^
1 ( . , . )lb ubIM IMCI lb c ub c        where 
^
lb and
^
ub are the estimated lower and upper bounds and 
^
  are 
the estimated standard errors, obtained using one thousand bootstrap replications. For the MIV case, the 
^
lb and
^
ub are replaced by 
^
bclb and 
^
bcub  (the bias corrected lower and upper bounds). 
16 These MTR&MTS&MIV lower and upper bounds are computed in a slight different way. Following Blundell 
et al (2007), when the bounds cross, the upper and lower bound are consistent estimates of   E y t under the 
null that the difference between then is zero. But a more efficient approach is to use a weighted combination of 
them, that is:                  ˆ ˆ ˆ1
LB UBE y t E y t E y t   
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to HE is 0.47 the MIV upper bound is around 0.25. The effect of increasing one’s schooling 
from no qualification to HE ranges from 0.35 to 0.43, which is well below ETS point 
estimate.  
Table 2.5 shows bounds and ETS point estimates for men aged 33. As discussed 
above, the MIV bounds are very informative. The upper bound on the returns to education by 
moving from none to O-levels when MIV is employed almost coincide with ETS point 
estimates. MTR&MTS&MIV narrows down the estimate for (A-level, HE) to around 0.14, 
the ETS point estimate also fall outside the bias-corrected MIV confidence interval. The 
return to education when one moves from O-levels to HE drops down to around 0.22, with an 
ETS point estimate of 0.38. The upper bound on the return to schooling for individuals 
moving from no-qualification at all to HE ranges from 0.28 to 0.49, which is well below the 
ETS point estimates, however its confidence interval is quite wide. The upper bounds for both 
ages seems quite similar, however the lower bound for the 42 years sample is higher than for 
33 years sample, suggesting a higher return to schooling for the former one certainly related 
to work experience. 
In the following analysis, the estimates will focus on the returns for women. It is 
important to note that women’s return to education might suffer from sample selection, since 
women tend to self-select into labour market.  
Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2000) estimates returns to education for women 
taking into account the sample selection problem using the Family Resource Survey and 
British Household Panel Survey data. The estimates applying Heckman´s sample selection 
model were almost identical to OLS results for both samples. Median regression analysis 
(robust to sample bias) results show slightly higher returns to education for women, which 
could suggest a small effect due to selection in employment. Analyzing data from different 
European countries the authors showed that countries with the highest rates of female 
participation have the lowest differences between male and female returns to schooling, while 
countries with the lowest participation have the largest difference. According to the authors, 
however, this bias does not appear to be large.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Where   0,1 and    ˆ
LBE y t and    ˆ
UBE y t are, respectively, the estimates for lower and upper bounds. 
We report the estimates with  0.5 ; alternative values for  give similar qualitative results. 
34 
 
Vlasblom and Schippers (2004) using the European Labour Force Survey show an 
increase in female labour market participation between 1992 and 1999 in Europe and in the 
UK. The estimates also show that participation rates have increased for women both with and 
without children, and for both low and high-educated women. According to the authors this 
might be interpreted as a behavioural change between generations reflecting that working 
wife has become more and more usual in European countries. This could reinforce the fact, 
suggested by Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2000),   that the bias from sample selection in 
the return to education between men and women in the UK may not be large. 
Table 2.6 presents the mean wages by qualification levels, for women aged 42 and 33. 
The observed wage increases with the type of qualification, which is also in line with our 
monotonicity assumption. Tables 2.7 and 2.8 also show the validity of using quintiles of math 
and reading ability as an MIV, with the mean wage function monotonically increasing in 
ability quintiles for all ages.  
Tables 2.9 to 2.10 present the results on bounds as well as the ETS point estimates for 
the ATE for women aged 42 and 33. In Table 2.9, the MTR&MTS upper bound is generally 
lower than the ETS point estimates. The bias corrected MIV bounds greatly reduce (increase) 
the upper (lower) bounds compared to the MTR&MTS. The MIV upper bound for (O-levels, 
A-levels) sharply drops to 0.08, well below the ETS point estimate of 0.40. The MIV upper 
bound for (O-levels, HE) narrows down to 0.32 while the ETS point estimate is 0.69. Using 
quintile of ability as an MIV reduces the upper bound for (None, HE) further to 0.58, the ETS 
point estimate also falls outside the bias-corrected MIV confidence interval. 
In Table 2.10 the MIV upper bound estimates for (O-levels, A-levels) are around 0.12 
while the ETS point estimate is 0.21. The MIV returns to education from moving from no-
qualifications to A-levels ranges from 0.24 to 0.37, the ETS point estimate of 0.45 is then 
outside this range. The bounds for quintile of ability as an MIV for moving from no-
qualifications to HE is also informative with the upper bound dropping to 0.53 for reading 
ability. 
The estimates also show that the MIV upper bounds are higher for women than for 
men, especially for (O-level, HE) and (None, HE), which is in line with the literature on 
returns to education. One should also note that bounds on MIV reading ability are more 
informative for women’ estimates. 
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2.5.2 General Household Survey (GHS) 
 Bounds on return to education are also computed using the General Household 
Survey (GHS) from 1979 to 2006. GHS has the advantage to allow us to use the change in the 
minimum school leaving age as an MIV, an instrument often employed in the literature (see 
Harmon and Walker (1995) for example). GHS is a continuous survey, which collects a range 
of information on households in Great Britain. The survey has been carried out continuously 
since 1971 except for breaks in 1997/98 and 1999/2000. The first increase in the minimum 
SLA, from 14 to 15, was in 1947. A subsequent increase in the SLA occurred in 1973, which 
increased the minimum age from 15 to 16. So the exogenous change in the minimum SLA is 
used as an MIV. We assume that people affected by the changes in SLA have weakly higher 
mean wages functions since individuals exposed to these changes might have acquired more 
years of schooling. 
 Individuals who entered their 14th year between 1947 and 1971 and thereby faced a 
minimum SLA of 15 and those who entered their 15th year after 1972 and faced a minimum 
SLA of 16, were all affected by the changes in law.  
The same education based measures as in NCDS were adopted: no qualifications (or 
extremely low levels), O-level or vocational equivalent, A-levels or vocational equivalent, 
and those with some sort of higher education qualification (HE). The sample was restricted to 
British-born adults aged between 30 and 65, full time workers and not self-employed. As we 
focus only on the second SLA change (SLA 16) we drop from the sample individuals who 
faced the minimum school leaving age of 14. 
Tables 2.11 presents the mean wages by qualification levels for men and women 
respectively.17 The observed mean wages increase with qualification levels for both genders. 
This is in accordance with the adopted MTR&MTS assumptions. 
Table 2.12 shows the mean wages according to the SLA-MIV variable. The latter is 
defined as a binary variable that equals one if the SLA is 16 and zero otherwise. The results 
show evidence supporting the validity of the SLA variable as an MIV, since the mean wage 
function monotonically increases. 
                                                          
17Annual wages deflated by UK Retail Prince Index. 
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Table 2.13 presents bounds and ETS point estimates on ATE for men using GHS data. 
The upper bounds on MTR&MTS are not very informative since they are higher than the ETS 
point estimates. Adding the change in SLA as an MIV though reduces the width of the 
bounds. The ETS point estimate almost coincide with the SLA-MIV upper bound for (None, 
O-levels). Using SLA as an MIV reduces the bounds on (O-levels, A-levels) and (A-levels, 
HE) further to 0.12 and 0.15, lower than ETS point estimates  The resulting upper bound on 
the return to schooling obtained by moving from no qualifications  to A-leves narrows down 
to 0.39. In the same fashion, the effect of increasing one’s schooling from O-levels  to HE 
narrows down to 0.26, which is well below the ETS point estimates of 0.48 Finally the SLA-
MIV reduces the upper bound for (None, HE) further to 0.53, the ETS point estimate also 
falls outside the bias-corrected MIV confidence interval 
Table 2.14 presents the results for women. Again, MTR&MTS bounds are not very 
informative. The SLA-MIV upper bound obtained by moving from no-qualifications to O-
levels shrinks to almost 0.17. Additionally, the upper bound when one goes from O-levels to 
A-leves also reduces to 0.26,  below the ETS point estimate of 0.34The SLA-MIV upper 
bounds on returns to education for (None, A-levels) and (O-levels, HE) shrink to 0.47 and 
0.45, well below the ETS point estimate of 0.663 and 0.62 respectively. Finally the MIV 
upper bounds for moving one´s education from no qualifications to HE is also with the upper 
bound dropping to 0.59, the ETS point estimate also falls outside the bias-corrected MIV 
confidence interval. 
2.6. Comparing Partial Identification Bounds to Others Identification Approaches 
Manski and Pepper (2000), Gonzalez (2005) and De Haan (2011), compare their non-
parametric bounds on ATE with some parametric (IV and OLS) estimates found in the 
literature.18 Such a comparison is possible since the joint MTR&MTS assumption on Manski 
and Pepper (2000) and the MTR&MTS&MIV assumption employed in Gonzalez (2005) and 
De Haan (2011) have enough identification power. Moreover, following Gonzalez (2005), De 
Haan (2011), and Giustinelli (2011) we compare non-parametric bounds on ATEs under 
                                                          
18 Manski and Pepper (2000) compute bounds on returns to schooling, Gonzalez (2005) bounds on returns to 
language skills while De Haan (2011) compute bounds on the effects of parents’ schooling on child´s schooling. 
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MTR&MTS and MTR&MTS&MIV with parametric OLS and IV estimates performed on the 
same sample. 19 
Non-parametric bounds are then compared with estimates that employed different 
identification approaches. First, bounds are compared with the estimates computed by   a 
linear OLS (ETS) and IV  regression model (using change in SLA as an IV), performed on the 
same sample. According to Giustinelli (2011), any point-estimate obtained under stronger 
assumptions should lie within the non-parametric bounds if the econometric model is 
correctly specified. 
Table 2.15 shows the results in which the change in SLA is used as an instrument in a 
2SLS regression. As results so far have basically focused on ATE, a 2SLS regression model is 
estimated for (None, O-levels) and (O-levels, A-levels). We focus only on lower 
qualifications because as pointed out by Chevalier et al (2004) individuals at the low end of 
the qualification distribution were the most affected by this instrument. 
Table 2.15 panel A shows that although the ETS point estimate almost coincide with 
the SLA-IV upper bounds on (None, O-levels), the latter is lower than the linear IV point 
estimate of 0.34. For women though, the MIV upper bound is well below both the ETS and 
IV point estimates. Panel B shows estimates for (O-levels, A-levels). Using SLA as an MIV 
yields bounds that are also lower than the linear OLS and IV point estimates for both men and 
women. 
   Non-parametric bound estimates are now compared with some point estimates 
reported in the empirical literature. Blundell et al. (2005) employing parametric   techniques 
and using the NCDS data, computed returns to qualifications for men aged 33. Using several 
OLS and matching models, they found estimates for moving from no-qualification to HE that 
ranges from 44% to 59%. The lower bound of their point estimates coincides with our 
previous result for the Math_MIV upper bound, as shown in Table 2.5. 
When moving from O-levels to HE, MTR&MTS&MIV yields an estimate of around 
0.22. Blundell’s (2005) estimates fall outside these bounds, as they lie in the 0.30 to 0.38 
interval. By comparing the results obtained for moving from no-qualifications to A-levels, 
Math_MIV estimates a rate of return between (0.16, 0.30). All the point estimates found by 
                                                          
19 Guistinelli (2011) develops non-parametric bounds on quantiles and compute bounds on returns to schooling 
using an Italian data set. 
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Blundell (2005) lie exactly within this interval. The MIV bounds on Δ(2,3) are well below the 
point estimates using other identification approaches which ranges from 0.24 to 0.29. The 
point estimates reported for Δ(1,2) lie in the bias-corrected MIV confidence interval. This is 
also true for the Δ(0,1) estimates. 
 Dearden (1998) used NCDS data to compute the returns to qualifications for men and 
women. The author used an OLS approach and found a 50% return to a degree for males and 
64% for females. These point estimates tough are higher than the upper bound for MIV 
estimates reported in tables 2.5 and 2.10.  
Walker and Zhu (2001), using LFS data from 1993-2000, found a yearly return to schooling 
to bachelor degree for men ranging from 0.46 to 0.51 and to a master´s degree from 0.50 to 
0.58 Although the HE measure used in this chapter indistinctively encompasses both 
qualifications, their point estimates almost coincide with the upper bounds of SLA-MIV 
estimates.  
2.7 Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter aimed at identifying regions for the returns to schooling in the UK. In 
order to do so, Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000) non-parametric bounds were 
applied. The nonparametric bounds analysis gives bounds on returns to education by relying 
on a set of weak and, in part, testable assumptions.  A comparison with the results using other 
identification approaches shows that non-parametric bounds give informative estimates on the 
returns to education. The estimates show some evidence that the returns to education - 
computed through weaker assumptions - are smaller than some of the point estimates reported 
in the literature. This is especially true for higher qualifications.  
Specifically the method does not assume linearity of the response function nor 
exogenous selection into treatment. Moreover, instead of using the traditional IV approach to 
tackle the selection problem, which is usually prone to criticisms, a MIV was assumed, which 
is a weaker and often more credible assumption. 
Okumura and Isui (2010), which also found smaller estimates for the return to 
schooling in the US, argued that the higher returns to schooling computed in previous studies 
could be due to the linear response assumption. The results found in Belzil and Hansen (2002) 
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cast doubts on the validity of very high returns reported in the empirical literature.20 The OLS 
estimates, which rely on the hypothesis that the endogenous schooling variable is orthogonal 
to unobserved determinants of wages, can critically biased upward the average return to 
education. The IV estimator is usually applied in a linear wage function, which leads to a bias 
in the estimates. Moreover, the IV approach might overestimate the returns to education if the 
instruments are invalid. 21 
This work has also focused on the estimation of local (marginal) returns to schooling 
instead of the average returns. As pointed out by Belzil and Hansen (2002), estimates which 
impose equality between local and average returns to schooling will be affected by the 
relative frequency of individuals with high and low taste for schooling. The average effect 
will be biased towards the local returns, which is most recurrent in sample data. In such a 
case, local returns could lead to more reliable estimates of the true return. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The authors estimate a structural dynamic programming model of schooling decisions with unobserved 
heterogeneity in school ability and market ability. 
21 Carneiro and Heckman (2002) criticize the valid of some of the instruments usually employed in the literature, 
showing that they are either correlated with ability proxies or uncorrelated with realized years of schooling. 
 
40 
 
              Table 2.1: Mean (log) wages by qualification levels - NCDS by ages - Men 
S 
Mean (log) wages  
(42 years) 
N Mean (log) wages  
(33 years) 
N 
None 2.16 234 2.03 225 
O-level 2.41 1,186 2.29 1,200 
A-level 2.58 710 2.39             712 
HE 2.86 1,293 2.66 1,065 
  3,423  3,202 
Note: None: no or low qualifications; O-level: O-levels or vocational equivalent; A-levels: A-levels 
or vocational equivalent; HE: some type of higher education qualification. Real (log) hourly wages. 
N=number of observations. 
 
          
Table 2.2: Mean (log) wages by Math Ability at 11 - NCDS  - Men 
Quintiles of Math 
Ability  
Mean (log) wage 
(42 years) 
Mean (log) wage 
(33 years) 
1 2.243 2.147 
2 2.449 2.279 
3 2.539 2.378 
4 2.689 2.484 
5 2.886 2.644 
   
Low ability 2.424  
 
2.281 
 N=1,838 N=1,697 
High ability 2.795  2.569 
 N=1,585 N=1,505 
Note: Individuals in the lowest three quintiles were classified as “lower ability” and 
the remainder were classified as “higher ability”. Real (log) hourly wages.    
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Table 2.3: Mean (log) wages by Reading Ability at 11 - NCDS – Men 
Quintiles of Math 
Ability  
Mean (log) wage 
(42 years) 
Mean (log) wage 
(33 years) 
1 2.278 2.172 
2 2.449 2.295 
3 2.550 2.380 
4 2.676 2.471 
5 2.884 2.641 
   
Low ability 2.433  2.289 
 N=1840 N=1,699 
High ability 2.785  2.561 
 N=1583 N=1,503 
Note: Individuals in the lowest three quintiles were classified as “lower ability” and 
the remainder were classified as “higher ability”.  Real (log) hourly wages.  
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Table 2.4: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to Qualifications - NCDS 42 years – Men 
 
 
   
    MTR & MTS & MIV MTR & MTS & MIV 
ETS MTR&MTS (IV=Math Score) (IV=Reading Score) 
      
  Bias Corrected Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB LB UB 
 
 
0.246   0 0.452   0.113 0.217   0.095 0.160 
 (0.18;  0.31)    (0;0.52)   [0.05; 0.42]    [0.05;  0.34] 
 
 
0.185   0 0.307   0.095 0.095   0.102 0.102 
 (0.14;  0.23)    (0;0.34)   [0.06;  0.13]    [0.7;  0.14] 
 
 
0.28   0 0.375   0.140 0.140   0.143 0.143 
 (0.23; 0.32)    (0;0.41)    [0.11;  0.17]    [0.11; 0.18] 
 
 
0.432   0 0.536   0.230 0.301   0.224 0.247 
 (0.36;  0.50)    (0;0.59)   [0.17;  0.50]    [0.17; 0.43] 
 
 
0.465   0 0.482   0.237 0.237   0.246 0.246 
  (0.43;  0.50)    (0;0.52)    [0.20;  0.27]    [0.21;  0.28] 
 
 
0.711   0 0.712   0.371 0.427   0.352 0.400 
 
(0.64;  0.78)    (0;0.77)   [0.34; 0.63]    [0.32; 0.58] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) hourly wages. Numbers between parentheses are Imbens-Manski 95% 
confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals using bias-corrected MIV 
bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-level or equivalent, (2) A-level or equivalent, and (3) HE. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
(0,3)
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Table 2.5: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to Qualifications - NCDS 33 years – Men 
   
    MTR & MTS & MIV MTR & MTS & MIV 
ETS MTR&MTS (IV=Math Score) (IV=Reading Score) 
 
     
  Bias Corrected Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB LB UB 
 
 
0.265 0 0.410  .074 .251   0.073 0.283 
     (0.21;0.32) (0;0.45)      [0.03;  0.42]        [0.03; 0.45] 
 
 
0.106 0 0.212   0.065 0.065   0.062 0.062 
 (0.07; 0.14) (0;0.24)      [0.04;  0.09]     [0.04;  0.09] 
 
 
0.260 0 0.328  0 .138 0.138     0.149 0.149 
 (0.23;  0.30) (0;0.36)   [0.11;  0.17]  [0.12;   0.18] 
 
 
0.371 0 0.458   0.160 0.295  0.153 0.328 
 (0.32 ;  0.43) (0;0.50)      [0.11;  0.46]    [0.11;  0.50] 
 
 
0.367 0 0.386   0.213 0.213   0.221 0.221 
 (0.34 ;  0.40) (0;0.42)      [0.18;  0.23]     [0.19;  0.25] 
 
 
0.632 0 0.633   0.295 0.445   0.281 0.490 
 
(0.58;  0. 68) (0;0.68)     [0.26; 0.62]             [0.25; 0.69] 
 [0.24; 0.63] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) hourly wages. Numbers between parentheses are Imbens-Manski 95% 
confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals using bias-corrected MIV 
bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-level or equivalent, (2) A-level or equivalent, and (3) HE. 
  
 
Table 2.6: Mean (log) wages by qualification levels - NCDS by ages – Women 
S 
Mean (log) wages 
42 years 
N 
Mean (log) wages 
33 years 
N 
None 1.83          261 1.66 216 
O-level 1.98 1,592 1.89 1,288 
A-level 2.12 506 2.10 377 
HE 2.52 1,118 2.44 780 
  3,447  2,661 
Notes: None: no or low qualifications; O-level: O-levels or vocational equivalent; A-levels: A-levels or 
vocational equivalent; HE: some type of higher education qualification. Real (log) hourly wages. 
N=number of observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
(0,3)
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Table 2.7: Mean (log) wages by Math Ability at 11 - NCDS  - Women 
Quintiles of Math 
Ability  
Mean (log) wage 
(42 years) 
Mean (log) wage 
(33 years) 
1 1.910 1.758 
2 2.026 1.921 
3 2.124 2.030 
4 2.272 2.159 
5 2.441   2.325 
   
Low ability 2.033 1.923 
 N=2,014 N=1,502 
High ability 2.350 2.238 
 N=1,433 N=1,159 
Notes: Individuals in the lowest three quintiles were classified as “lower ability” 
and the remainder were classified as “higher ability”. Real (log) hourly wages.    
 
 
Table 2.8: Mean (log) wages by Reading Ability at 11 - NCDS –
Women 
Quintiles of Math 
Ability  
Mean (log) wage 
(42 years) 
Mean (log) wage 
(33 years) 
1 1.918 1.802 
2 2.012 1.883 
3 2.117 2.019 
4 2.259 2.177 
5 2.451 2.305 
   
Low ability 2.026 1.912 
 N=1,967 N=1,445 
High ability 2.346 2.236 
 N=1,490 N=1,216 
Notes: Individuals in the lowest three quintiles were classified as “lower ability” 
and the remainder were classified as “higher ability”. Real (log) hourly wages. 
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Table 2.9: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to Qualifications – NCDS 42 
years – Women 
   
    MTR & MTS & MIV MTR & MTS & MIV 
ETS MTR&MTS (IV=Math Score) (IV=Reading Score) 
      
  Bias Corrected Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB LB UB 
 
 
0.221   0 0.360 0.04 0.234 0.026 0.073 
 (0.18;  0.26)       (0; 0.42)   [0.0; 0.47] [0.0;0.25] 
 
 
0.401   0 0.297 0.076 0.076 0.081 0.081 
 (0.38;  0.46)      (0; 0.33)   [0.04; 0.11] [0.05;0.11] 
 
 
0.262   0 0.488 0.231 0.248 0.232 0.235 
 (0.19; 0.34)    (0; 0.53)   [0.18; 0.31] [0.20;0.27] 
 
 
0.651     0 0.442 0.127 0.305 0.117 0.165 
 (0.61;  0.69)      (0; 0.50)   [0.10; 0.50] [0.08;0.32] 
 
 
0.692      0 0.562 0.301 0.322 0.304 0.321 
 (0.62;  0.77)      (0; 0.60)   [0.27;  0.39] [0.27;0.38] 
 
 
0.913   0 0.707 0.316 0.581 0.321 0.405 
 
(0.83;  0.99)       (0; 0.77)   [0.28; 0.82] [0.29;0.59] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) hourly wages. Numbers between parentheses are Imbens-Manski      
95% confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals using bias-
corrected MIV bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-level or equivalent, (2) A-level or equivalent, 
and (3) HE. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
(0,3)
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Table 2.10: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to Qualifications – NCDS 33 
years – Women 
   
    MTR & MTS & MIV MTR & MTS & MIV 
ETS MTR&MTS (IV=Math Score) (IV=Reading Score) 
      
  Bias Corrected Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB LB UB 
 
 
0.237 0 0.433 0.069 0.206 0.076 0.107 
  (0.18;  0.29) (0;0.48)          [0.02; 0.43]        [0.03; 0.29] 
 
 
0.214 0 0.336 0.12 0.12 0.117 0.117 
  (0.17; 0.26) (0;0.38)          [0.09; 0.15]  [0.8; 0.15] 
 
 
0.343 0 0.484 0.130 0.269 0.163 0.269 
  (0.30;  0.39) (0;0.52) [0.08; 0.33] [0.10; 0.34] 
 
 
0.451 0 0.554 0.149 0.367 0.175 0.241 
 (0.39;  0.52) (0;0.60)  [0.11; 0.59] [0.13; 0.43] 
 
 
0.557        0 0.578 0.290 0.349 0.298 0.368 
  (0.52; 0.59) (0;0.61)  [0.26; 0.41] [0.26; 0.43] 
 
 
0.795 0 0.795 0.315 0.60 0.324 0.525 
 
(0.74; 0.85) (0;0.84)  [0.28; 0.84] [0.29; 0.71] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) hourly wages. Numbers between parentheses are Imbens-
Manski 95% confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals using 
bias-corrected MIV bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-level or equivalent, (2) A-level or 
equivalent, and (3) HE. 
  
Table 2.11: Mean (log) wages by schooling levels by gender – GHS 
Z 
Mean (log) wages 
Men 
N 
Mean (log) wages 
Woman 
N 
None 9.64 7,237  8.70 6,895 
O-level 9.87 8,939  9.08 10,332 
A-level 10.07 4,081 9.36 3,001 
HE 10.35 7,655 9.70 6,930 
        27,912  27,158 
Real (log) annual wages. N=number of observations. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
(0,2)
(1,3)
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Table 2.12: Mean (log) wages by SLA-MIV variable  - GHS 
SLA-MIV 
Mean (log) wage 
(Men) 
Mean (log) wage 
(Woman) 
SLA16=0 
9.78 8.74 
N=10,320 N=7,293  
SLA16=1 
10.09 9.34 
 
N= 17,592  N= 19,865 
Real (log) annual wages. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.13: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to Qualifications - 
GHS – Men 
 
ETS MTR&MTS MTR & MTS & MIV 
   Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB 
 
 
0.234          0 0.362    0.106      0.242 
 (0.20;  0.25)    (0; 40) [0.08; 0.296] 
 
 
0.205          0 0.339    0.122      0.122 
 (0.17 ; 0.24)    (0; 0.36) [0.09; 0.15] 
 
 
0.272          0 0.451    0.101      0.147 
 (0.24;  0.31)   (0; 0.48) [0.06; 0.19] 
 
 
0.436          0 0.511    0.202       0.394 
 (0.40; 0.47)   (0; 0.54) [0.17; 0.45] 
 
 
0.477          0 0.537    0.256       0.256 
 (0.45;  0.50)   (0; 0.56) [0.22; 0.28] 
 
 
0.708          0 0.704    0.31       0.534 
 
(0.68;  0.73)   (0; 0.73) [0.29; 0.59] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) annual wages. Numbers between parentheses are 
Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 95% 
confidence intervals using bias-corrected MIV bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-
level or equivalent, (2) A-level or equivalent, and (3) HE. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
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(0,3)

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Table 2.14: ETS Point Estimates and Nonparametric Bounds on Returns to 
Qualifications - GHS –Women 
 
ETS MTR&MTS MTR & MTS & MIV 
   Bias Corrected 
   LB      UB LB UB 
 
 
0.383    0 0.562         0.167   0.167 
 (0.36;  0.41)   (0;  0.61)                 [0.14; 0.19] 
 
 
0.280           0 0.463        0.156 0.156 
 (0.24;  0.32)   (0;  0.50)                 [0.06; 0.24] 
 
 
0.340           0 0.590       0.134   0.263 
 (0.39;  0.38)   (0;  0.64)                   [0.05; 0.43] 
 
 
0.663          0 0.749       0.158   0.466 
 (0.62;  0.71)   (0;  0.78)                 [0.05; 0.50] 
 
 
0.618          0 0.714       0.246   0.451 
 (0.59;  0.65)   (0;  0.74)                  [0.16; 0.50] 
 
 
1.01          0 1.02       0.434   0.594 
 
(0.96; 1.03)   (0;  1.05)                  [0.35; 0.62] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) annual wages. Numbers between 
parentheses are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are 
Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals using bias-corrected MIV bounds. Levels of 
qualifications are (0) none, (1) O-level or equivalent, (2) A-level or equivalent, and (3) HE. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0,1)
(1,2)
(2,3)
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Table 2.15: Returns to Schooling Using Change in SLA an (M)IV 
 
  MTR & MTS & MIV 
        OLS IV Bias Corrected 
 (ETS) Change in SLA LB UB 
Panel A 
 
    
 
 Men   
 0.234 0.339    0.106      0.242 
 
 
(0.20;  0.25) (0.29; 0.39) [0.08; 0.296] 
 
 Women   
 0.383 0.654         0.167   0.167 
 
(0.36;  0.41) (0.61;0.69)        [0.14; 0.19] 
 
   
Panel B  Men  
 0.205 0.55    0.122      0.122 
 
(0.17 ; 0.24) (0.49;0.60) [0.09; 0.15] 
 
 Women  
 0.280 1.516        0.156 0.156 
 
(0.24;  0.32) (1.46; 1.70)      [0.06; 0.24] 
Note: Dependent variable is individuals’ real (log) annual wages. Numbers between parentheses 
are Imbens-Manski 95% confidence intervals. Numbers between brackets are Imbens-Manski 
95% confidence intervals using bias-corrected MIV bounds. Levels of qualifications are (0) 
none,(1) O-level or equivalent and (2) A-level or equivalent. 
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Figure 2.1: Wages as a function of Qualifications levels: bounds and ETS point estimates – NCDS Men 
42 years old 
 
Notes: Qualifications levels are: (0) none, (1) O-levels, (2) A-levels, and (3) HE. MIV bias corrected bounds.  
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Figure 2.2: Wages as a function of Qualifications levels: bounds and ETS point estimates – NCDS 
Women 42 years old 
 
Notes: Qualifications levels are: (0) none, (1) O-levels, (2) A-levels, and (3) HE. MIV bias corrected bounds.  
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Figure 2.3: Wages as a function of Qualifications levels: bounds for (A-level, HE) – NCDS Men 42 
years old  
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Figure 2.4: Wages as a function of Qualifications levels: bounds for (A-level, HE) – NCDS Women 42 
years old 
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Chapter 3: The short and long term effects of an Educational Funding Reform on 
Regional Inequality in Brazil 
3.1 Introduction 
Public policies in education have usually focuses on expanding the quantity of 
education with less attention paid to quality. Debates about how to improve the quality of 
public education often focus on whether governments should increase their spending per pupil 
or reduce class size. The effects of school resources on students’ outcome are rather 
controversial since there is no consensus in the literature about whether increasing school 
resources improves student achievement. This chapter aims to contribute to this literature 
evaluating a policy that increased funding per students in Brazil. 
 As in other developing countries, education policies in Brazil have in the last decades, 
largely focused on increasing primary and secondary school enrolment rates, with the final 
goal of achieving higher levels of educational attainment. More recently, however, the main 
concern has become the quality of education. One could argue that the development of 
cognitive abilities provided by the educational process depends crucially on the quality of 
education that one receives. Thereby, it is essential that an increase in school access to be 
accompanied by efforts to improve quality. 
Little is known about how effective expenditures are at increasing pupil’s performance 
and attainment. A crucial policy matter is, therefore, whether an increase in per pupil 
expenditure is able to improve students’ outcomes. There is a large and controversial 
literature analysing the relationship between educational expenditures and student’s 
achievement, both in developing and developed countries. In a review of the literature, 
Hanushek (2006) found no significant relationship between school resources and student 
performance. Glewwe et. al (2011) gives an overview of the literature for developing 
countries of the effects of schools’ and teachers’ characteristics on student attainment and 
found very mixed results. Holmlund et all (2010) and Gibbons et all (2012) found positive 
effects in schools resources on pupils achievement for the UK. Leuven et all (2007) on the 
other hand found no effects and even some negative estimates of additional school resources 
on students’ performance in the Netherlands. The key question is, thus, whether higher 
spending translates into student achievements. Identifying the impacts of a higher per pupil 
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spending on educational performance is crucial since it is directly related to the formulation of 
efficient public policies within the realm of limited resources. 
Brazil is commonly known for its cross region income inequality. Such regional 
disparity is also observed for education inputs and outputs. These disparities were mainly 
created by policies that left education funding largely to the local authorities. As richer States 
and municipalities have more capacity to invest in public education and attract better teachers, 
differences in public education structure between rich and poor regions are striking. These 
differences can be seen in terms of schools inputs, such as libraries, computers, qualified 
teachers; and school outputs, such as drop-out rates, test scores, years of schooling and so on.  
In fact the discrepancy in education achievement is mainly responsible for the large income 
inequality that takes place between and within regions (Reis and Paes de Barros, 1990).  
In 1998, Brazil implemented an education funding reform called FUNDEF (Fundo de 
Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e Valorização do Magistério).  The 
policy established, among other things, a minimum level of resources to be spent exclusively 
on the primary education system. Post reform, states and municipalities had to spend 15% of 
their total revenue exclusively on the maintenance and development of primary education.22 
The program also established a minimum amount of spending per pupil and required that at 
least 60% of FUNDEF allocations had to be spent on teacher’s wages. In 2007, the policy was 
expanded, changing its name to FUNDEB (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento da 
Educação Básica e de Valorização dos Profissionais da Educação) and incorporated other 
levels of the educational system, such as pre school and secondary education. Moreover, it 
also increased the fraction of total public revenues allocated exclusively on the maintenance 
and development of public education (pre school, primary and secondary educations): from 
15% in 2006 to 16.67% in 2007, 18.33% in 2008, and 20% in 2009 onwards.  
The reform changed the structure of public education funding and was responsible for a 
large increase in education spending.23 One of the major goals of the reform was to reduce the 
large disparities within and across states, with the ultimate goal of reducing inequalities in 
terms of students’ achievements. The program also aimed at increasing school quality, by 
                                                          
22 These expenditures include expenses related to the acquisition, maintenance and operation of facilities and the 
equipment necessary for teaching, use and maintenance of goods and services, payment and training of 
education's professionals, purchase of textbooks, school transport, among others. 
23According to the World Bank (2010), FUNDEF/FUNDEB was responsible for a significant increase in 
education spending in Brazil since 1998, both in real terms and as a share of GDP. Gordon and Vegas (2005) 
showed that educational expenditure in all regions increased in the 1996-2002 period. 
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improving school inputs such as schools´ infrastructure and teacher qualifications since 
FUNDEF/FUNDEB resources were also intended to improve teachers training.  
Indeed, FUNDEF/FUNDEB policy is one of the largest educational reforms ever 
implemented in the country. This study thus explores the large increase in the amount of 
resources intended to education brought by the reform. This study has two main goals. The 
first one is to analyse whether the increase in education expenditures brought by the reform 
reduced inequality in terms of schools resources between poor and rich areas. We estimate 
whether FUNDEF program had an impact on school quality by exploring variations in 
revenues received by municipalities. School quality inputs are analyzed in terms of schools 
infrastructure and teachers characteristics. The second one is to assess whether the increase in 
the availability of resources to schools translated into higher student performance. The idea is 
to assess both the short term effects, by analysing students’ test scores, and also somewhat 
longer term effects, such as the impact on education attainment. 
The identification strategy explores the fact that the intensity of the reform varied by 
municipality. There was a substantial variation in program intensity across the country since 
poor municipalities with high levels of enrolments benefited the most. There were also some 
variations in the intensity of the reform within years as the amount received by a given 
municipality could also vary from year to year. The identification strategy explores these 
cross time within municipality and cross municipality within-time variations.  
FUNDEF/FUNDEB resources were distributed among States and municipalities 
according to the relative enrolments in the previous year. As municipalities with higher 
number of students enrolled in their educational system receive more resources from the fund, 
they could manipulate their enrolment figures in order to receive a larger share of resources. 
To reduce this potential endogeneity problem in our variable of interest, an instrument for the 
observed revenue received from the program by municipalities was constructed.  
 This work contributes to the evaluation of the effects of one of the major educational 
policies ever implemented in Brazil. The regional approach and the analysis of the different 
effects between rich and poor areas, not yet explored in studies about the 
FUNDEF/FUNDEB, should be the subject of an extensive discussion, since education 
disparities are one of the major causes of the large income inequality across the country. This 
study also contributes for the evaluation of FUNDEF somewhat long term impacts which, as 
far as we are concerned, has not been explored yet. The comprehension of the effects of the 
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reform on largely diverse Brazilian regions is crucial to identify the strengths and weaknesses 
of the program and to contribute for the adoption of policies that are more sensitive to local 
realities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
FUNDEF/FUNDEB Program. Section 3.3 reviews some of the literature. Section 3.4 briefly 
describes the background of the Brazilian educational system. Section 3.5 brings the empirical 
strategy adopted and the identification problem arising from the evaluation of the effects of 
the reform on schools inputs and student’s achievement. Data are described in section 3.6, 
while Section 3.7 presents the main results of the chapter. Finally, section 3.8 summarizes and 
concludes. 
3.2 The FUNDEF Program 
FUNDEF was created in 1997 and implemented in all Brazilian States by January 
1998. The program changed the structure of public education funding in Brazil. Before the 
program, the 1988 National Constitution had established that 25% of States and 
municipalities’ total revenue and 18% of the Federal Government’s total revenue would have 
to be spent on their respective public educational systems. The 1988 National Constitution 
increased the amount of resources allocated to education, but it also increased the 
heterogeneity of public schools within and across States. In fact, this rule implemented in 
1988 ended up transmitting the country’s economic disparities to the educational system. 
Moreover, there was no mechanism to guarantee that resources were actually being spent on 
items directly related to education (Menezes-Filho and Pazello, 2007).  
The FUNDEF program maintained the educational expenditure levels at 25% of all 
taxes and transfers, but required States and municipalities to spend 15% of their total revenue 
exclusively on the maintenance and development of primary education. However, instead of 
being directly applied in the different government levels, resources were directed to a 
common State fund, being lately reallocated to States and municipalities according to the 
number of students enrolled in the previous year in their respective educational systems. The 
program also established a minimum amount of spending per pupil. The Federal Government 
complements funds in cases where the minimum spending levels in the state is not achieved. 
Moreover, 60% of FUNDEF allocations had to be spent on teacher’s wages.  
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For example, suppose that a municipality had R$100 in total revenues (from tax and 
transfers). According to the 1988 constitution, the municipality had to spend R$25 on 
education with resources allowed to be spent according to its preferences. After the FUNDEF 
program was introduced, the municipality had to donate R$15 to a common State fund. The 
amount received back from the fund would depend on the number of pupils enrolled in its 
primary education. If the municipality’s share of total pupils was equivalent to its share of 
total resources, then it would receive the same R$15 back. Moreover, at least R$9 (60% of 
R$15) had to be spent on primary school teachers’ wages. Suppose now that the Federal 
Government established a minimum spending per pupil of R$1. Suppose further that a 
municipality had 15 students enrolled in its primary education - so R$1x15= R$15. However, 
if the municipality had 20 students enrolled in its primary education then it would receive an 
additional R$5 from the federal fund.   
In 2007, the policy was renamed FUNDEB, and gradually increased the fraction of 
total public revenues allocated to the fund: from 15% in 2006 to 16.67% in 2007, 18.33% in 
2008, and 20% in 2009 onwards. FUNDEB also incorporated other levels of the educational 
system, such as preschool and secondary education.  
Another change brought by FUNDEB regards the Federal Government’s role. From 
2007 on, the Federal Government, contribution to the fund became mandatory.  Its 
contribution have also increased from 2007 (R$ 2 billion in 2007 to R$ 4.5 billion in 2009). 
The contribution was then set up at 10% of the sum of all States’ funds from 2010 onwards. 
The Federal resources are distributed among States by giving priority to the ones with the 
lower levels of spending per pupil.  
FUNDEF(B) dramatically changed the structure of funding of the educational public 
system in Brazil. One of the aims of the reform was to reduce the disparities in the allocation 
of resources within and among regions. Besides, by increasing the amount of resources 
allocated to public schools the reform also aimed at improving the quality of basic education. 
As schools would now have more resources to spend not only on teacher salaries, but also on 
other school inputs such as libraries and computers.  
Figure 3.1 presents education expenditures per pupil as a share of GDP per capita. 
These data refer to consolidated investments in education by the Federal Government, States 
and the Federal District and municipalities. The figure shows an increase in the share of 
resources destined to primary education during the period. Despite the great increase in the 
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GDP per capita during 2000-2011, there was a clear rise on the proportion of expenditures 
spent in primary education.24 Thus, the increase on spending per pupil observed in the period 
was not only due the economic growth but was clearly associated to an increase on the 
proportion of the resources destined to education.  
Figure 3.2 presents the evolution of municipal expenditures on education as a share of 
municipal GDP during the 1997-2011 period.25 The figure shows a clear increase in education 
expenditures during the period. The poorest regions (North and Northeast) have spent a higher 
share of their GDP on education, which is quite a desirable result. The Figure also shows a 
peak in 1998 when FUNDEF was first implemented. Again, the figure also shows an increase 
in municipal spending in education as a share of GDP. 
 Figure 3.3 presents municipal real spending per pupil by region.26 Despite an increase 
in the share of educational expenditures per GDP by the municipalities located on the poorest 
regions of the country, their spending per pupil actually remains lower than in municipalities 
located in richer regions. The Figure also shows a great deal of inequality in expenditure per 
pupil across regions in Brazil. Even with increases in education spending, the North and 
Northeast, historically the poorest regions in Brazil, have the lowest levels of per pupil 
spending during the whole period. The richest regions, South and Southeast, spent around 
R$4.000 per pupil in 2011, while the poorest ones spent around 50% of this amount. There is 
also a significant variation on per pupil spending between years. 
More important than knowing that there was an increase in education expenditures, 
one should ask what this expenditure figures would actually look like if there had been no 
reform. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show spending on education by percentile of GDP per capita. The 
figures illustrate what would be the total municipal spending on education in the "absence" of 
reform. In order to do this, the total expenditure on education was simply subtracted from the 
net amount of resources received by the municipalities from the fund. Thus, municipalities in 
                                                          
24 Real GDP per capita in Brazil grew around 30% during the 2000-2011 period (IPEADATA), while real 
expenditure per pupil on primary education grew almost 170% in the period (INEP). 
25 Unfortunately, the latest information available on municipal GDP - prior to 1997 - is for 1985, but there is no 
information on municipal spending on education for this year. It is also important to note that the “spending on 
education” variable refers to all education levels and not only to primary education. Nonetheless, as the vast 
majority of students in municipalities are in primary schools, the variable represents well the evolution on 
primary education spending.  
26 From 1995 to 2001, expenditures in education and culture were available only in aggregated terms. However, 
around 95% of the total spending were directed to education. Again the "municipal spending on education" 
variable refers to all education levels.  
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which the contribution to the fund was simply equal to what they have received from it, had 
no “real” gain from FUNDEF. For municipalities that lost resources to the fund (contributions 
higher than the funds received) we suppose that there was neither a gain nor a loss. Since rich 
municipalities were still able to reach the spending goal established even losing resources to 
the fund. 
Figure 3.4 shows education spending per pupil (with and without the reform) for 
municipalities in the top quartile of GDP per capita. The difference on education spending 
becomes more significant only from 2006 on. This is due the fact that in the initial years of 
the reform the vast majority of these municipalities either did not gain any resource from the 
fund or actually lost resources to it. However, expenditures without FUNDEF policy may 
actually be overestimated, since it was assumed that these municipalities had actually spent all 
their contribution to the fund on their education systems. Figure 3.5, on the other hand, shows 
education spending per pupil with and without the reform for municipalities in the bottom 
quartile of the GDP per capita. The Figure displays a remarkable feature: the actual education 
spending for the poorest municipalities would have been much lower without the reform, 
especially after 2006, when the reform not only incorporated other education systems but also 
gradually increased the resources allocated to education. As before, education spending 
without the reform might be actually being overestimated so the differences presented may 
actually be greater. 
3.3 Literature Review 
There is a large and somewhat controversial literature analysing the relationship 
between school resources and student’s achievement. Discussions about school expenditures 
began with the pioneering work by Coleman et al. (1966). Notwithstanding the substantial 
research in recent years, as shown in Hanushek (2006) and Hanushek and Rivkin (2006), 
there still a lack of a clear consensus on the impact of specific education policies on student 
learning.  
In a review of the literature, Hanushek (1997, 2003) argued that there is no significant 
relationship between school resources and student performance. Analysing 376 estimates of 
education production functions for developed countries, Hanushek (2003) found that, for the 
most of them, there was no relation between schools inputs and educational performance. In 
terms of teacher-pupil ratio, only 14% of the estimates found positive and statistically 
61 
 
significant effects on student performance. 27 However, another 14% of the estimates showed 
a negative and statistically significant effect. Moreover, the vast majority of the estimates 
(72%) found no significant effects.   
Krueger (2003), however, contradicts these findings. According to the author, 
Hanushek’s analysis applies equal weights to every estimate and therefore studies with a 
higher number of estimates were assigned much more weights than others. Moreover, these 
studies often rely on small samples and misspecified models. Assigning equal weights to each 
study analysed, Krueger found that the literature actually showed a systematic link between 
class size and student achievement.  
Glewwe et. al (2011) reviewed the literature of the effects of schools’ and teachers’ 
characteristics on student attainment and learning. Analysing studies from 1999 to 2010 for 
developing countries, the authors found that, despite the increase in the number and quality of 
the literature, little is known about the impact of education policies on student outcomes. The 
authors suggest two possible reasons. Firstly, the same policy could have quite different 
effects across countries and even within countries. Second, much of the literature has centred 
their attention on basic school and teacher characteristics. However, the way in which schools 
are organized and their interactions may matter the most. 
Analysing studies for class sizes in developing countries, Glewwe et. al (2011) 
verified that, in general, larger class sizes have negative impacts on student learning. 
However, 9 out of 29 studies (30%) showed a significant and positive. Considering only the 
sample of high quality studies, the authors found that, in overall, the estimates suggested a 
negative impact of class sizes on student learning. However, the results are not as decisive, 
since five studies found significantly negative effects, while three studies found a positive and 
significant effect. The authors also review the literature on the effects of schools’ inputs on 
daily attendance of students, current enrolment, and years in school. Considering 14 high 
quality studies, the authors find that building new schools increases enrolment and years of 
completed schooling. Other school inputs such as teacher's qualification and characteristics of 
the schools showed very mixed results.  
Guryan (2001), using a regression discontinuity design to analyse a policy that is 
similar to the FUNDEF reform; The Massachusetts Education Reform Act (MERA) aimed at 
                                                          
27 276 estimates 
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decreasing within-state inequality in per-pupil spending by increasing the amount of resources 
to districts that historically have spent less on schools. Guryan found a positive effect of 
education spending on test scores. The estimates suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in per-pupil spending ($1,000) increases math, reading and science test scores by 
around half of a standard deviation for 4th graders.  
Card and Payne (2002) evaluate the effects of school finance reforms in the US on 
students’ performance. They found that the reforms narrowed the spending gap between 
poorer and richer districts and that reduction in spending inequality also reduced the gap on 
test scores within children from different backgrounds. 
Holmlund et all (2010) analyse the effects of an increase on school expenditures in the 
UK on student's achievement. School expenditures in the UK increased in real terms after 
2000 after many years of stagnation. The results show a positive effect of school expenditures 
on national tests taken at the end of primary school. The results also show evidence of a 
greater effect for students from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Gibbons et all (2012) also using data for the UK explore the fact that similar schools 
close to Local Authority boundaries end up receiving different levels of funding to estimate 
the effect of school funding on pupil performance. The results show that the differences in 
funding levels were associated with sizable differentials in pupil attainment in urban schools. 
Machin et all (2010) analyse an UK educational policy, which gave extra resources to 
schools – the Excellence in Cities Programme. According to the results, the policy was 
effective at improving Mathematics achievement and school attendance. The policy had a 
larger effect on more disadvantaged schools and on the performance of middle and high 
ability students within these schools, showing however little or no effect on low ability 
students. 
Leuven et all (2007) evaluate the effect of two subsidies targeted at disadvantaged 
pupils in the Netherlands. The subsidies provide extra resources to schools to improve 
teacher's condition and to acquire computer and software. The estimates show no significant 
effects for the teachers’ subsidy and even some negative effects for the computer subsidy on 
students´ achievement.  
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Van der Klaauw (2008) evaluates the US Title I program which provides financial 
assistance for the expansion and improvement of instructional programs on schools with high 
concentrations of poverty. The estimates suggested that the program had no effect on 
improving student outcomes in high-poverty schools in New York City. 
In the context of FUNDEF, previous studies have analysed the effects of the reform on 
some aspects of the Brazilian educational system. De Mello and Hoppe (2005) using state- 
and municipality-level data during 1991-2002, found that FUNDEF contributed to the fast 
increase in net enrolment rates in primary education, especially in small municipalities.  
Gordon and Vegas (2005) showed FUNDEF revenues have indeed translated into 
education spending. Employing School Census data from 1996 to 2002 the results show that 
the program had a large effect on increasing enrolment rate in municipalities where spending 
per pupil was below the new minimum established by the law. They also presented some 
evidence on class size reductions and teachers’ qualifications, which have also contributed to 
the reduction of age/grade distortion. Finally, they found a weak link between mean spending 
and student achievement.  
Also employing Brazilian School Census data, Estevan (2009) showed that, FUNDEF 
was associated with a decrease in the share of private primary school enrolment, especially for 
the grade one. The study also showed that the reform improved some quality indicators at the 
school level, such as teacher’s qualification and infrastructure. According to the author, 
quality improvements brought by the reform may explain the decrease in the share primary 
enrolment in private schools.  
Anuatti et al. (2003) point out for positive effect of the program on public school 
teachers' salaries. The program seems to benefit the most teachers from municipal schools 
located in smaller cities and poorer regions.  Additionaly, Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2007) 
investigated the impact of FUNDEF reform on teachers’ relative wages and students’ test 
scores. The authors explore the fact that wages in public schools were changed exogenously 
by FUNDEF reform to identify the impact of teachers’ wages on the students’ outcomes. 
Using data from SAEB (Sistema de Avaliação do Ensino Básico) for 1997 and 1999 for 
students at the 8th grade and a difference and difference strategy, they found an effect of 
reform on teacher´s salaries, and a positive effect of  the latter on students’ performance 
(about half standard deviation).  
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Franco and Menezes-Filho (2010) applying a difference in difference approach and 
using School Census from 1997 to 2005, found that FUNDEF increased enrolment rates and 
the number of teachers in primary education. The program also had a positive effect on the 
proportion of teachers with higher education in the upper primary system. The results also 
show some evidence of positive effect on student´s approval rate and a negative effect on the 
drop-out rates.  
Andrade et al. (2009) using School Census data for 1997 and 1999, before and after 
FUNDEF implementation, and employing a difference and difference approach analyse 
whether the introduction of FUNDEF reform influenced teachers’ behaviour in public 
schools. The author argue that FUNDEF reform generated incentives for teachers to increase 
students’ fail rate and consequently their salaries, since FUNDEF resources were directly 
proportional to the relative number of students enrolled in public schools in states and 
municipalities. The results suggested that public school´s teachers engaged in this 
opportunistic behaviour in order to affect the number of students enrolled in their schools 
when compared to teachers from private schools. This behaviour however varied in intensity 
depending on the number of schools in the municipality or state. When there are many 
schools, teachers have a lower incentive to influence the fail rate in one school since his/her 
behaviour has a negligible effect on the amount of resources received by the municipality 
where their schools are located. 
For the Brazilian context, few studies have tried to link school quality and later 
outcomes like education attainment, employment, or earnings. Behrman and Birdsall (1983), 
using a State-level measure for teacher quality, examine the impact of school quality on 
educational returns and earnings. The inclusion of the school quality variable sharply reduces 
the estimated rate of return to years of schooling. Scholl quality increase has a strong and 
positive effect on earnings level through its impact on the rate of return to education.  
Curi and Menezes-Filho (2006) examine the relationship between test scores and 
wages of a young cohort of Brazilians workers. Using pseudo panel model, the authors 
followed two cohorts born in 1977-78 and 1987-88, in three stages of life: childhood (4-5 
years old), school (17-18 years) and the labor market (23-24 years). The results show a 
positive relationship between the performance on proficiency exams and future earnings. 
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  It should be noted that Gordon and Vegas (2005) is the only study that somewhow 
brings the regional inequality issue to the fore.  As far as we are concerned, there is no other 
work that broadly overlooks the program main objective: the reduction of inequality in 
schools inputs and especially in outputs within and between regions in Brazil. This is a gap in 
the literature that this paper aims to cover. Moreover none of the papers above have applied 
the empirical approach employed in this study, which is less subject to endogeneity problems. 
3.4 Backgrounds of the Brazilian Educational System 
Brazil is composed of 26 States plus a Federal District, and has 5,565 autonomous 
municipalities. Public schools are run by different government´s levels: the Federal 
Government, the State Government and Municipalities. The vast majority of schools are run 
by the latter two.  
The Brazilian educational system is divided into the following cycles: pre-school 
education - 0 to 5 years old students; lower primary education - grades 1 to 4 (consisting of 
four years); upper primary education - grades 5 to 9 (five years); secondary education (3 
years); college (four or five years)28. Each level of government is responsible for a given 
cycle. Municipalities are mainly responsible for the provision and management of pre-school 
and primary education. States’ governments are usually in charge of primary and secondary 
education, whereas the Federal Government is responsible for college education. 
Municipalities, however, play the largest role in public primary education: around 83% of 
primary students were enrolled in municipals school in 2007 (School Census, 2007). 
Municipals schools are funded mainly by local transfers and taxes and are usually run by the 
local governments.  
 In 1990 in Brazil, less than 40% of school age children completed the 8th grade of 
primary school, compared with 70% in the Latin American region (95% for the OECD). Over 
70% of children in Argentina and Chile were enrolled in secondary education (91% across 
OECD), while this figure was only 38% in Brazil. The average schooling for the adult 
population was 3.8 years, a figure well below the average for other Latin American countries 
(around 8 years in Argentina and Chile and 8.9 years in the OECD) (World Bank, 2010). In 
the last decades, however, Brazil has observed large improvements in educational attainment. 
Table 3.1 shows the average years of schooling for the adult population between 1960 and 
                                                          
28  In 2006, Brazil adopted a legislation extending the length of compulsory schooling by one year and creating a 
primary cycle with 9 years. The new entry age to primary school changed from 7 to 6 years.  
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2010 for selected countries. Despite Brazil having the lowest level of school attainment in 
2010 (7.3 years), it presented the fastest rate of increase in educational attainment between 
1990/2010.  
In the last decades, Brazilian investment in education has largely focused on 
increasing primary and secondary school enrolment rates. In 1980, the net enrolment rate in 
primary education was 64%. This rate rose to 86% in 1991 and reached 100% in 2003, 
indicating that virtually all children between 7-14 years were at school (Riggoto and Souza, 
2005).29 According to PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domicílios), the net 
enrolment rate in secondary education has also rose from 18% in 1991 to around 52% in 
2010. 
Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of the net and gross enrolment rate for primary 
education. From 1998 onwards the net enrolment rate was always above 90%, reaching 
almost 95%, meaning a high number of children enrolled at the appropriate grade level. There 
was also a decrease on the gross enrolment rate from 2000, which reflects a reduction of 
age/grade distortion.30 
Nonetheless, despite the improvement observed in the number of students covered by 
the educational system, the quality of education offered by public schools and, therefore, its 
student’s performance is still an issue. SAEB (Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica) 
evaluates students from the 4th and 8th grades of primary education and also 3rd year students 
from secondary education on reading and math tests. The results for the 2003 evaluation 
showed that 55% of the students in 4th grade were concentrated in the very critical and critical 
stages of proficiency in reading. In the North and Northeast regions (poorest regions of the 
country), this figure reached 70% and 66% respectively, while for the Southeast and South 
(richest regions) the figures were 44% and 47% respectively. For the math test, 52% of the 
students in 4th grade were concentrated in the very critical and critical stages of proficiency. In 
reading, this indicates an inability to understand short and simple texts. In mathematics, the 
‘very critical’ and ‘critical’ levels gather students who cannot solve simple problems 
                                                          
29 However, this universal enrolment in primary education does not translate into students graduating in the 
equivalent proportions. In 2000, only 44% of enrolled students were able to finish this level of education. 
Among students who complete primary education, only 72% go on to high school. 
30 The net and gross enrolment rates presented in the figure are for public and private schools. However, for 
private schools both rates were quite constant during the period. 
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formulated from everyday situations involving addition or subtraction of natural numbers 
(INPEP, 2005).  
These results are much in line with the ones found by the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). Over the past decade, the tests offered by PISA have allowed 
countries to track students’ performance. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the percentage of students 
below the proficiency level 2 in reading and math in PISA standardised test scores.31 Figure 
3.7 shows that around 50% of the Brazilian students are below proficiency level 2 in reading. 
From Figure 3.8, 70% of Brazilian students in 2009 were below proficiency level 2 in math. 
Thus, the majority of students in Brazil are classified in the category of “lowest performers - 
lacking basic skills”. However, while some knowledge has been gathered on how to improve 
school access, little is known about cost-effective policies that improve quality. 
3.5 Empirical Strategy 
Since the changes in policy rules were common to all municipalities from 1998 
onwards, one can consider that the only source of variation promoted by FUNDEF was the 
amount of resources received by the municipalities from the fund, since; poor municipalities 
with higher levels of primary school enrolment were the principal beneficiaries of the 
reform.32 
Therefore, our first purpose is to estimate whether FUNDEF program had an impact 
on school quality by exploring variations in revenues received by the municipalities from the 
fund. School quality inputs were analyzed in terms of schools infrastructure; some measures 
of school’s basic infrastructure are considered such as share of schools with electricity, 
running water, sewage, principal office, and toilet inside the building. Other related 
infrastructure measures are also included: the share of schools with a library, computer lab, 
science lab and sport facilities and teacher quality measures such as the proportion of teachers 
with a degree and pupil-teacher ratio. Here we focus only on municipal schools and primary 
education, since this cycle was the first affected by the policy and the vast majority of primary 
students are enrolled in municipal schools. 
                                                          
31 Students below proficiency Level 2 are considered the lowest performers, since basic skills in reading and 
math are considered lacking. The proficiency levels range from 1 to 6, being 6 classified as the top performers 
(OECD, 2009). 
32 For now on FUNDEF and FUNDEB are going to be used interchangeably. 
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jt jt jt t j jt jty F X d m n u                                                                      (1) 
Where jty  is the outcome of interest in municipality j in year t; jtF  denotes the 
amount of resources received from the fund for municipality j at year t by the population 
between 7 to 15 years old ; td  is a year fixed effect; jm  is a municipality fixed effect; jtn  is a 
municipality specific time trend; jtX represents the controls variables and jtu denotes the 
random error.   
Our main objective is to estimate the effects of the program on the reduction of 
school’s inequalities between and within regions. Given that, we estimate:  
 ( * )jt jt jt jt jt jt t j jt jty F F g g X d m n u                                  (2) 
where jtg is the municipality average per capita income in year t, which measures 
whether FUNDEF’s revenue had a different impact on poor and rich municipalities. We 
expect a larger effect on the poorest regions as they were mainly net receivers. Control 
variables include total population, age 7-15 population, municipal GDP per capita and other 
municipal transfers and revenues. The latter was introduced given it is potentially correlated 
to FUNDEF resources. Regressions are weighted by municipality size to take into account 
that improving outcome in a bigger municipality is more important than improving it in a 
small one. Moreover, if the reform has mostly affected small municipalities then it has a small 
impact on the overall population, which should be reflected in the weights. Robust standard 
errors clustered by municipality-year are computed. 
Another important issue is how to measure the impact of the FUNDEF reform in a 
given municipality. The first solution, is simply to use the amount received from the State 
fund by each municipality ( jtF  in equation (1,2)). Another possibility is to use, the difference 
between the contribution to the fund and the revenue received from it, which is shown below. 
The impact of the reform varied depending on the difference between what a municipality has 
paid to and received from the fund. For example, if the revenue received from FUNDEF by a 
given municipality is close to its contribution, the impact of the reform on this municipality is 
virtually zero. On the other hand, if a municipality receives a substantial amount from the 
fund compared to its contribution, the impact of the reform would be large. Thus, an indicator 
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that measures the intensity of the impact of the reform in each municipality is constructed as 
follows.  
 
=                   
 
, ,
,
Received from FUNDEF  –  Contributed to FUNDEF
Contributed to FUNDEF
j t j t
j t
                                                      (3) 
 Where the amount received from the fund by the municipality j in year t depends on 
the number of students enrolled in the municipal system , 1j tE   in year t-1, plus the amount of 
resources received from the federal government. The municipal contribution to FUNDEF is 
equal to 15% of municipalities’ taxes and transfers.  
Considering that, we also estimate a model as 
 jt jt jt t j jt jty I X d m n u                                                                    (4) 
where jtI  measures FUNDEF intensity given by (3) 
Figure 3.9 illustrates the distribution of the intensity of the FUNDEF reform by 
region. It is worth noting that the FUNDEF reform had a quite significant impact on the 
poorest regions. Most municipalities in the North and Northeast regions were net resource 
receivers and some of them received up to six times the amount of their contribution. For the 
richer regions (Southeast, South and Center-West) the mode is around zero, meaning that 
most of their municipalities contributed with a similar amount from what was received from 
the fund.  
Figure 3.10 displays the distribution of the FUNDEF intensity by percentile of 
municipal income per capita. The Figure shows that municipalities in the bottom percentile 
(number 1) were the most affected by the reform as the distribution is highly skewed to the 
right. For the municipalities on the top percentile the mode is centred on zero. 
Moreover, Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show that not all municipalities were positively 
affected by the reform since some of them were in fact net contributors. This is mainly true 
for richer municipalities. For some of them the amount of resources allocated to the fund 
, 1 , , ,
,
,
( ) 15%
15%
j t j t j t j t
j t
j t
E Fundef Federal taxes
IntensityFundef
taxes
  

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(15% of all transfers and taxes) were in fact higher then the amount that they would have 
received given FUNDEF rules. Therefore, there was a substantial variation in the exposure to 
the program across the country, since poor municipalities with high levels of enrolments 
benefited the most. Thus, in order to try to recover FUNDEF effects on schools inputs and 
outputs, our identification strategy explores this variation in terms of resources. 
 The second objective of this study is to evaluate whether the increase in the funding 
provided by the reform translated into an improvement in students’ performance. More 
formally, the following equation is specified:                                      
isjt jt jt isjt jt t j jty F g aX W d m u                                                      (5) 
where isjty  is the proficiency of student i in school s in municipality j at year t; the X vector 
contains student’s race, gender, age, a dummy variable for whether the student has failed 
before, mother’s education, if the student works, dropped-out before, school entry age, a 
measure of the economic situation of the student (measured in terms of number of bedrooms 
in the house, number of bathrooms, number of cars his family has, if the family has a 
computer) and whether the school has adopted a cycle regime instead of the conventional 
grade regime.33 We also control for some municipal characteristics such as: the size of 
population between 7 to 15 years, the municipality GDP per capita, child mortality rate, 
illiteracy rate, share of people over 25 with a degree, share of children vulnerable to poverty, 
unemployment rate - 18 years or more -, percentage of population living in households with a 
toilet and running water, percentage of population living in households with electricity, 
percentage of population living in households with inadequate water supply and sanitation 
and percentage of householders mothers without primary education and  with at least one 
child younger than 15.34 It is important to control for all these municipalities’ characteristics 
since students from areas with better social economic conditions might also have a better 
education environment. Estimates were not controlled for school characteristics since, in 
principle, all of them were affect by the reform (excepted for the cycle/grade regime that is 
not related to the reform). 
                                                          
33 More about this policy on the next section. 
34 The variable “share of children vulnerable to poverty” is measured as the proportion of individuals’ with14 
years old or less which household income per capita is equal or less ½ of the minimum wage. 
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The impact of the reform on students test scores was not only contemporaneous but also a 
result of the years attending a public school with better resources (a cumulative effect). The 
data allow us to observe how many times a municipality were treated during the 1998-2011 
period. Estimates were then computed for both the contemporaneous and cumulative effects   
We also explore the impact of the funding reform on intermediate and somewhat long 
term outcomes. The effects are analysed in terms of the probability to complete primary 
education, to complete secondary education, probability to attend high school, and in terms of 
completed years of schooling.  More formally: 
( * )st st st st t s st stist isty F F g X W d t v u                                           (6) 
Where isty  is the outcome of individual i in State s at year t;  stg  is the State average 
per capita income in year t. The coefficient of interest in then   which measures the effect of 
the policy on the most affected States after 1998;  is a year fixed effect and st  is the State 
fixed effects and stv  is a State specified trend. The X vector contains individual’s race, 
gender, age, a dummy variable for whether the person lives with his mother, mother’s 
education, a dummy variable for work, household income per capita, and length of primary 
education (8 or 9 years). Some State controls (W) are also included such as the proportion of 
poor and extremely poor (as well an interacted term with a dummy for observations post 
2001, year when Bolsa Escola/Bolsa Familia was implemented), the proportion of public 
schools which adopted the cycle regime, State GDP per capita, population aged 6 to 18.   
3.5.1 The Identification Problem 
An identiﬁcation issue could arise in equations (1) to (6) if the reform is correlated 
with unobserved factors that also affect school indicators. This could happen if the resources 
received from the fund are not exogenous. The amount received depends on the amount of tax 
revenues collected within a State and on the number of students enrolled in municipal schools 
in the previous year. All municipal taxes linked to the fund are in fact State or Federal taxes in 
which municipalities participate in. Moreover only the Federal and State governments set 
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collection and distribution rules. Therefore, municipalities have very little manipulation 
power over them.35 
  The endogeneity problem becomes more relevant with regard to the enrolment rates in 
each municipality. As municipalities with higher number of students enrolled in primary 
education receive more resources from the fund, they could manipulate their enrolment 
figures in order to receive a larger share of resources. This might introduce an endogeneity 
problem in our variable of interest. To deal with this issue, a variable was constructed 
simulating the revenues each municipality would receive in each year based on current taxes, 
FUNDEF’s distribution rules and enrolment rates reported in the 1996 School Census.3637 So, 
the instrument depends on pre-law enrolment rates, on current Federal and State taxes, and on 
current FUNDEF’s distribution rules (set by the Federal Government), which are exogenous 
to any particular municipality’s primary investment. Moreover, to control for possible 
differences in municipalities’ time trends regarding municipalities’ initial enrolment figures in 
primary education, a linear time trend t was interacted with the fraction of population between 
7-15 years old enrolled in public primary education. 
The distribution coefficient below represents the share of each government entity to 
the amount of FUNDEF resources collected in each State. The coefficient is calculated as 
follow: 
, ,1996,
1996
, ,1996, ,1996,
( )t
j
ti ti j s i
FUNDEF
jst j s
ti ti j s i ti ti s i
f w enroll
dc enroll
f w enroll f w enroll



 
                        (7) 
where j index municipality; s State, t year; so 1996( )
tFUNDEF
jstdc enroll  represents the 
distribution coefficient for municipality j located in State s in year t; i index education level; 
, ,1996,j s ienroll  represents the number of enrolments in a given municipality in a given State for 
a given level of education in 1996;38 tiw is the weighting factor and tif represents the 
                                                          
35 Federal and State Governments also have limited manipulation power over taxes. Federal Government have 
their tax rates and rules for collection and distribution specified by the Constitution. Some State taxes also have 
its minimum or maximum rates determined at the federal level. 
36 As the reform was first implemented in 1998 some municipalities could have inflated their enrolled rates in 
1997 in a response to the new reform rules.  
37 Kosec (2011) employs a similar instrument to estimate the effects of the program on pre-primary related 
variables. 
38 Note that all enrolment rates are based on 1996 School Census. 
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percentage of enrolments in each education level considered.39 The distribution coefficient is 
then multiplied by the total amount of resources collected by the fund in a given State and 
year, which results in the financial value received from the fund by each municipality, 
computed as follow:  
jst jst stFundef dc Total                                                                                                 (8) 
Where jstFundef  is the amount, based on 1996 enrolment, received from the fund by 
municipality j in State s in year t; and stTotal  is the total amount collected by the fund in State 
s in year t. 
It shall be demonstrated in the next section that the instruments are correlated with 
observed per capita revenue and with its interactions with per capita income. The instruments 
are built based on pre-law enrolment rates, current Federal and State taxes, and on FUNDEF’s 
distribution rules, which are exogenous to any particular municipality’s primary investment.  
Given that we assume that the exclusion restriction holds, in another words, that simulated per 
capita revenues and its interactions are exogenous at the municipal level. 
It is not a simple task to explore all the effects that a reform of this scale may have had 
in the Brazilian public education. That is because other important changes also took place in 
the Brazilian educational system in the period. During the period analysed, some school 
systems adopted the so-called Progressão Continuada program. This program divides the 
educational system into cycles instead of grades. In addition to the conventional annual grade 
repetition regime a learning cycle regime was introduced in which students progress by 
cycles, of usually three grades, and not by school years. In the final year of a cycle  students  
that  do  not  meet  the minimum  requirements  are  retained. General Education Act of 1996  
(Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional: LDB) first allow the introduction of the 
new regime but, it was effectively implemented from 1998.The program however was not 
adopted by all Brazilian public schools and, the ones which adopted it did not follow a unique 
implementation schedule. Koppensteiner (2014) found a negative effect of the Progressão 
Continuada program on 4th grade students´ test scores in the State of Minas Gerais. Menezes-
Filhos (2008) showed evidence of higher promotion rate and a lower dropout rate for urban 
state schools that adopted the program. The estimates also showed a significant negative 
                                                          
39 The values for tiw  and tif  are presented in Table A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. 
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effect in proficiency of 8th grade students, whereas the impact for 4th grade students was not 
significant. To deal with the possible effects of Progressão Continuada program on our 
estimates, a control for whether the school has adopted the cycle regime is also included. 
In 1996, Brazil established a minimum schooling requirement for kindergarten and 
lower primary education (1st to 4th years) teachers.40 Teachers from this cycle should have at 
least secondary education. We assume, however, that this law does not affect the probability 
of completing a college degree.  
Another important policy in Brazil during the period was the “decentralization” 
process of public schools. The decentralization is the total or partial transfer of primary 
education from States to municipalities. The FUNDEF reform created incentives for the 
decentralization as it provided the financial resources needed for such change. Since the 
decentralization process was only feasible because of the funding provided by the FUNDEF 
reform, some authors consider both reforms as a single wider one. This process could affect 
our empirical strategy in what regards the municipalities’ enrolment rates. However, our 
strategies dealing with the endogeneity of the enrolment rates should alleviate this concern.  
Conditional cash transfer programs targeted to low income families was also an 
important policy implemented in period. Implemented in 2001, Bolsa Escola program 
transferred grants to poor families in order to enable them to invest adequately in theirs 
child´s schooling and health. From 2003, Bolsa Família unified all previous social programs 
such as Bolsa Escola and largely expanded the number of beneficiaries. In order to receive the 
grant, families have to keep their children at school. Children between 6 to 15 years old must 
have an attendance frequency of least 85%, while students from 16 and 17 years old must 
have an attendance frequency of at least 75%. Some studies have shown that Bolsa Familia 
has a positive impact on enrolments, attendance and grade progression for children from 
beneficiary families (Oliveira et al., 2007; Glewwe and Kassouf, 2011). In order to deal with 
Bolsa Familia effects we control for several individuals and municipalities’ poverty related 
variables. 
                                                          
40 Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação de 1996, Artigo 62. 
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3.6 Data 
Our empirical analyses combine several data sources. School information came from 
the Annual School Census available from the Ministry of Education. This survey is filled out 
at the school level and includes information on student enrolment, number of teachers, 
teachers’ educational attainment, and school characteristics. The data also have information 
for public (Municipal, State, and Federal) and private schools. We focus only on municipal 
public schools, since they are the ones mainly responsible for providing primary education 
and, therefore, the most affected by the reform.41  
A municipal level panel data from 1997 to 2010 is then constructed with several 
important aspects on primary education quality. Some measures of school’s basic 
infrastructure are considered such as: share of schools with electricity, running water, sewage, 
principal office, and toilet inside the building. Other related infrastructure measures are also 
included: the share of schools with a library, computer lab, science lab and sport facilities in 
addition to teacher quality measures such as the proportion of teachers with a degree and 
pupil-teacher ratio. Given the high correlation, especially among the school infrastructure 
variables, a principal components analysis (PCA) was utilised to combine these variables into 
two infrastructure quality indices. Measures such as the share of schools with electricity, 
running water, sewage, principal office, and toilet inside the building were combined into an 
index of basic school infrastructure quality called Infrastructure I Quality Index. Moreover, 
measures such as the share of schools with a library, computer lab, science lab and sport 
facilities were combined into another index of infrastructure quality called Infrastructure II 
Quality Index. The first principal component from each of these PCAs was then used to 
construct the indexes. For both indexes and to all regions considered, the first principal 
component explains at least 50% of the variation of the variables. 
Table 3.2 shows some descriptive statistics for the School Census data. Some school 
inputs such as the proportion of computer labs, sport facilities, and libraries have increased in 
the period; however, their levels are still very low. Some basic infrastructure items like access 
to running water, electricity, and toilet inside the school buildings have also increased during 
                                                          
41 Only schools which offer primary education were considered. We also exclude schools with less than ten 
students enrolled and which had no teacher in this level education. 
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the period. In 2010, around 62% of primary teachers had a college degree; Pupil teacher ratio 
has decreased by around 3 from 1997 to 2010. 
The data set Finanças do Brasil (Finbra), consolidated by the Brazilian Federal 
Treasury, provides information on the amount of resources that each municipality contributed 
to and received from the fund. It also contains data on education expenditures, municipal 
revenues, and expenses as well as aggregated data for the States and Brazil as a whole. 
Information available from 1998 to 2010 was used in this study.42  
Table 3.3 shows some summary statistics for the School Census data and municipality 
revenues by regions. The data shows a great deal of inequality in terms of schools inputs, 
especially between poorest (North and Northeast) and richest regions (South and Southeast). 
The North and Northeast regions have the highest revenue per capita and on average their 
municipalities received two times more than the amount they contributed to fund.   
Annual municipality-level data on income per capita, population, and population-by-
age are available from IPEADATA. Municipal data on child mortality rate, illiteracy rate, 
unemployment rate, and the covariates, such as the share of population with a higher degree, 
share of children vulnerable to poverty, the percentage of population living in households 
with a toilet and running water, the percentage of population living in households with 
electricity, the percentage of population living in households with inadequate water supply 
and sanitation, the percentage of householders mothers without primary education and at least 
with one child younger than 15 are available from the Atlas of Human Development in Brazil 
(Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil), which is based on Brazilian Census.  
 In order to investigate the effects of the reform on student’s test scores, data from 
Prova Brasil was used. Prova Brasil is a survey carried out by the Ministry of Education 
containing information on Math and Portuguese test scores for 4th and 8th grade students. 
There is also a detailed set of information on students, teachers, and principals for public and 
private schools. The data consist of a representative sample of schools and are available from 
2007 to 2011 (every two years). 43 A municipal panel data was then construed. In the 
estimates, data on math test scores for students at the 8th (9th) grade were used.  As the data 
from Census is only available for 2000 and 2010, we use the 2010 census information on 
                                                          
42 The drawback of this data is that there is not enough pre reform municipal information available. 
43 Prior to 2007, students’ test scores were measured by Sistema Nacional de Avaliação Básica (SAEB). 
However, SAEB data are not representative at the municipal level, but only at the State level. 
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several municipal characteristics. Compared to 2010, one can consider that 2009 and 2011 
municipals’ features are quite constant. We also assume that they would not have changed 
much from 2007 to 2010.  
 Table 3.4 presents some descriptive statistics for the Prova Brasil data. Students from 
the North and Northeast regions have the lowest average test scores. These regions also 
present the lowest share of white students. The proportion of students who have repeated a 
grade before is extremely high in all regions. In the poorest regions (North and Northeast), 
more than 40% of the students have repeated a grade before. The data also shows mothers’ 
low level of education. Municipals variables show the great inequalities among regions. The 
North and Northeast regions present the highest levels of illiteracy rate and lower share of 
people with a college degree. Besides, around 70% of the children in these regions are 
considered vulnerable to poverty. The high proportion of children from a poor background 
certainly represents a great challenge in terms of improvement of student’s attainment. 
A sample data from the PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios) was 
employed to analyse the effects on education attainment. PNAD is a sample survey which 
collects annual information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristic of the 
population such as: education, work, earnings, migration status, fertility and family 
composition. We use the data from 1992 to 2011 (except 1994, 2000 and 2010 when there 
was no survey) and focus on individuals who were most affected by the reform – individuals 
aged 6 to 19.44 As PNAD is not representative at the municipal level, FUNDEF impact is 
evaluated at the State level. The sample is restricted to individuals who were born and have 
always lived in the same State.  
Summary statistics for this sample are presented in Table 3.5. According to the Table 
3.5 around 84% of the individuals between 6 to 14 attend primary education. The completed 
years of education is low given the low age of the sample. The proportion of people attending 
secondary education is remarkably low, around 35% (people aged 15 to 18). Consequently, 
the share of individuals with complete secondary education is also low (22%). The variable 
                                                          
44 The school age in Brazil is from 6 to 17 years old, 18 and 19 years old were also included since there is a high 
proportion of people with 18 years still attending  secondary education. 
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revenue per capita is the sum of the revenues received from the fund by the municipalities 
plus the revenue received by the States.45 
3.7 Results 
This section is divided into three subsections. The first one analyses the effects of the 
reform on schools inputs. The second section investigates the effects of the funding reform on 
students test scores and the third one focuses on the program impacts on intermediate effects. 
3.7.1 School Inputs 
In this section we begin by presenting the effects of the reform on school inputs. Table 
3.6a to 3.6c present the estimates of the first-stage regressions. The estimates for the North 
and Northeast regions were aggregated since they are very similar in many economic and 
social aspects. Despite the South and Southeast being the richest regions in the country, the 
Southeast region is much more heterogeneous in terms of income per capita than the South, so 
the effect on these regions will be analysed separately.  
Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) in Table 3.6a show that simulated municipal per capita 
revenue is positively correlated with observed municipal per capita revenue. Colum (3) 
indicates that a R$1 increase in simulated per capita revenue increases actual per capita 
revenue by R$0.75. The fact that the coefficients are not equal to 1.0 is justified by the way in 
which the instrument was built, which considered only the variation on municipal revenues’ 
and maintained constant the level of primary enrolment. In all specifications, the F-statistic on 
the excluded instrument is over 61.0, suggesting that there are no weak instruments 
problems.46 Table 3.6b also presents IV first stage results for simulated per capita revenue 
interacted with income percentile as instruments. The F-statistics also suggest that the 
instruments built did not suffer from weak instruments problems. Table 3.6c, in turns, shows 
the IV first stage results for the variable “Intensity Fundef”. This variable was instrumented 
using the “simulated intensity Fundef” which is based on the simulated revenue. Again, the 
instrument suggested seems to be quite satisfactory.  
Table 3.7a presents OLS and IV estimates of the effects of FUNDEF revenue on 
educational spending per capita. The estimates for the South and Southeast regions indicate 
                                                          
45 There is no information available for the type of regime (cycle/grades) adopted by schools in the 1998 School 
Census. 
46 All F-statistics computed were above the critical values of Stock and Yogo’s (2005) weak ID test. 
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that an R$1 increase in revenue per capita results in an R$0.17 and R$0.22 increase in 
education spending per capita (i.e per population, not per student).47 For the Center-West a 
R$1 increase on revenue increases spending per capita by R$0.23. For the North and 
Northeast regions an extra Real (R$) of revenue per capita is associate with an R$0.27 
increase in municipal educational spending. So an extra increase of revenue per capita results 
in a higher increase in per capita education spending in the poorest regions. For the South and 
Centre-West, the OLS estimate is smaller in magnitude than IV. Kosec (2011) suggest that 
there are also some channels for downward bias. If mayors have a high discount rate either 
because they are in their second term and cannot be re-elected, or because they are corrupt 
this may lead to less investment in publicly-provided goods like education. This could thus 
generate a downward-biased on OLS estimates. 
It is also important to estimate the effects of a rise in FUNDEF´s revenue given by the 
Federal government on educational spending. Table 3.7b estimates the effects of minimum 
spending level on educational spending per capita. As discussed before the Federal 
Government complements funds in cases where the minimum spending levels were not 
achieved. Only municipalities, which had not achieved the minimum spending per pupil, were 
entitled to the Federal government grant. During the period analysed an average of 35% of the 
municipalities received an extra revenue from the Federal Government. Table 3.6b presents 
the results for each region separately. The results suggest that an increase in the resources 
intended to complete the minimum spending level increases educational expenditures per 
capita in all regions. The effect is higher for the North region where a R$1 increase in 
minimum spending transfer per pupil increases education spending per capita by R$0.25. 
Despite of being, along with the North, one of the regions which have the highest proportion 
                                                          
47We use education spending per capita since from 1998 to 2004 the variable municipal education expenditure is 
available only in aggregate terms. This variable includes expenditures on all education levels such as childhood 
education, primary education, secondary education, vocational education, youth and adult education, special 
needs education, higher education and other education expenditures. For instance, in 2005, expenditures on high 
education and other education expenditures accounted for almost 10%, on average, of the total education 
spending. Some municipalities however report spending a much higher share, like 30%, 40%, 50% of their total 
education expenditure, on higher education and other education expenditures. The School Census data however 
does not compute the number of students on higher education in the municipalities and the spending reported on 
"other education expenditures" could be anything related to education. So spending per pupil based on School 
Census’ enrollment levels could actually overestimate the real spending per pupil for some municipalities and 
thus bias the estimates. It should be noted however that this should not affect much the graphs on spending per 
pupil. Since spending per pupil were aggregated by region and around 90% to 92%, on average, of municipal 
education expenditures are not higher education expenditures nor “other education expenditures”. Moreover, 
expenditures on primary education are around 80%, on average, of the total municipal education expenditures.   
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of municipalities that benefit from Federal transfers, a R1,00 increase in minimum spending 
transfer per pupil in the Northeast region represents an increase of only R$0.05. It should be 
noted however, that Federal transfers represent only a small proportion of the revenues 
received from FUNDEF. An instrumental variable for the minimum spending level transfers 
where not constructed since the minimum value per pupil is computed based on total amount 
collected by the fund in a given year, so it is not based on an exogenous rule.   
Table 3.8a and 3.8c show OLS and IV results for school inputs for Centre-West 
region. The results indicate a decrease in the infrastructure I quality index (basic 
infrastructure). This is quite an unexpected result. Colum (1) panel B, shows that a R$1000 
increase of revenue per capita is associated with a 0.54 standard deviation decrease in the 
infrastructure I quality index. This negative effect though is smaller for poorer municipalities. 
It appears that students were accommodated in schools with somewhat lower-quality basic 
infrastructure, for example on new schools in areas with worse basic infrastructure. The 
estimates show a positive effect on infrastructure II quality index for the municipalities most 
effect by the reform. A R$1000 increase in revenue per capita is associated with a 0.40 
standard deviation increase on infrastructure II quality index. The effects were greater for 
municipalities with a higher income per capita. The different results on the infrastructure 
quality indices however seem a bit controversial. Nonetheless it might reflect that a large 
number of schools in the Center-West region already have accessed to some basic 
infrastructure. Given that, the additional revenue has a greater effect on the infrastructure 
quality II index. The additional revenue may have led to the building of new schools on areas 
with worse basic infrastructure however; on average, the effect on the infrastructure quality II 
index was larger.  
For the variables proportion of teachers with a degree and pupil teacher ratio, the 
effects of the policy for the lower and upper primary are analysed separately since the results 
may differ between these two educational levels.  In terms of the proportion of teacher with a 
degree (Table 3.8b), the estimates show a decrease for the municipalities most affected by the 
reform. This could actually be related to an increase in the influx of new teachers on the lower 
primary education with secondary education only. The effect seems to be quite the same 
between poor and wealthy areas. The estimates show however a positive effect of the funding 
on the proportion of teachers with a degree on the upper primary education for municipalities 
in the bottom quintiles of income per capita, reinforcing the importance to analyse the two 
81 
 
education levels separately. For the poorest municipalities an increase on R$1000 in the 
revenue per capita is associated with a 6 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
teachers with a degree, which is almost 10% increase over the mean (mean 0.59). 
Table 3.8c shows the results for pupil teacher ratio for lower and upper primary 
education. Column (1) shows a decrease in the pupil teacher ratio in the lower primary. A 
R$1000 increase in revenue per capita reduces the pupil teacher ratio in the lower primary by 
2.07 on average, which represents a 10% decrease over the mean. However, the estimates 
show an increase in the pupil teacher ratio for the municipalities with a lower income per 
capita. The estimates show no effects for the upper primary education. As some studies point 
out for an increase in the enrolment rates this might suggest that the influx of new students in  
lower primary in low income municipalities was not offset by an influx of new teachers. Or 
the reason why we observe an increase in the pupil teacher ratio is that teachers capture the 
rent - the 60% of the budget being spent on teachers lead to an increase in the wages of 
teachers rather than an increase in the number of teachers. 
Table 3.9a and 3.9c present the OLS and IV results for the South region. Column (2) 
on Table 3.9a shows a positive effect on the basic infrastructure quality index for low income 
municipalities. It shows that a R$1000 increase in revenue per capita is associated with an 
increase 0.33 standard deviation in infrastructure I quality index for municipalities in the 
lowest percentile of income per capita. Overall, in terms of the infrastructure II quality index 
(library, sports facilities and computer lab), the estimates show a small but positive effect.  
Table 3.9b display the results for proportion of teachers of a degree. Column (2) and 
(5) shows an increase in the share of teachers with a higher degree in both lower and upper 
primary mainly for low income areas. Column (2) ((5)) shows that a R$1000 increase  in per 
capita revenue is associated with an increase of 0.07 (0.05) in the proportion of teacher with a 
degree in municipalities in the bottom percentile of income per capita, which represents a 
16% (7%) increase over the sample mean. The results for the FUNDEF intensity variable 
however are negative for both estimates. Table 3.9c show the results for pupil teacher ratio. 
The estimates show an increase in the number of students per teacher in the poorest regions 
for both lower and upper primary, which again might suggest that mainly for poorer areas the 
influx of new students, was not compensated with an increase in the number of teachers hired. 
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The results though show a reduction on the ratio for municipalities which received two times 
more than contributed to the fund.  
Tables 3.10a to 3.10c present the results for the Southeast region. There is a positive 
effect on the infrastructure quality I index mainly for the municipalities with a lower income 
per capita. Column (5), in turn, show a negative effect for on the infrastructure quality II 
mainly for municipalities in the bottom of income per capita, suggesting that in the poorer 
areas of the Southeast region the additional revenue were mainly intended to improve 
school´s basic infrastructure. Table 3.10b show a positive effect on the proportion of teachers 
with a degree for the lower primary education. According to column (2) a R$1000 increase in 
revenue per capita increases the proportion of teachers with a degree in 14 percentage points 
in the municipalities in the bottom percentile of income per capita (33% over the mean). The 
results also show in increase for the poorest municipalities on the proportion of teacher with a 
degree in the upper primary education. A R$1000 increase in revenue per capita is associated 
with a 27% percentage point increase in the proportion of teachers with a degree, which 
represents an increase of 37% over the mean. Table 3.10c suggest an increase in the number 
of pupil teacher ratio in the lower primary mainly for the poorest municipalities which is also 
true for the upper primary. It might suggest that in the poorest regions the main concern was 
to increase the levels of enrolments with less attention paid on the pupil teacher ratios. 
Finally, Tables 3.11a to 3.11c present the OLS and IV estimates for the North and 
Northeast regions, the poorest regions in the country. Column (1) and (2) reveal some effects 
on basic infrastructure with a higher impact for low income municipalities. Results in column 
(3) shows that municipalities which have received funds that are two times higher than their 
original contribution have an increase of 0.11 standard deviation in infrastructure quality I 
index. The estimates however show a negative effect on infrastructure II quality index.  
The estimate also indicates a negative effect on the proportion of teachers with a 
higher degree for the lower primary education for municipalities in the bottom percentile of 
income per capita. As for the Center-West regions this is probably associated with an influx 
of new teacher with secondary education only. Columns (4) to (6) show a positive effects for 
the proportion of teachers with a degree in the upper primary education. A R$1000 increase in 
the revenue per capita is associated with a 17 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
teacher with a degree, an increase of almost 40% over the mean. The effect seems to be the 
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same between poor and rich regions. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 3.11c show an increase in 
the proportion of pupil teacher ratio in lower primary education. The estimates are greater for 
the municipalities in the bottom of income per capita. A R$1000 increase in the revenue per 
capita is associated with an increase of 4.8 students for teacher in the lower primary for the 
poorest municipalities, which is quite a great effect. For the upper primary, the estimates 
show a decrease in the pupil teacher ratio. In column (4) a R$1000 increase the revenue per 
capita decreases the pupil teacher ratio by 1.68 on average. For the municipalities in the 
bottom percentile of income per capita an increase of R$1000 reduces pupil teacher ratio by 
1.77, which represents of reduction of 10% over the mean.   
The differences in the estimates between regions show how important a regional 
analysis is. The South, Southeast and the North and Northeast regions show an improvement 
on infrastructure Quality I index, meaning an improvement on schools’ basic infrastructure 
with greater effects for low-income municipalities. The Center-West and the North and 
Northeast regions present a reduction in proportion of teachers with a degree in the lower 
primary. This probably suggested an influx on new teachers in this education level with only 
secondary education. The South and Southeast in turn present an increase in the proportion of 
qualified teacher in lower primary education. All regions present and increase in the 
proportion of teacher with a degree in upper primary education, with the effects being greater 
for low income municipalities. The results also show an increase in the pupil teacher ratio in 
the lower primary education for all the regions. As some studies point out for an increase in 
the number of enrolments in the primary education but also an increase in the number of 
teachers hired, clearly the influx of new teacher were not enough to offset the influx of new 
students. The Center-West and the North and Northeast regions show no effects and a 
reduction for the pupil teacher ratio in upper primary. For the South and Southeast regions, 
there was an increase in the pupil teacher ratio mainly in the poorest regions. Overall, the 
results show a greater effect of the financing reform on the educational inputs for lower 
income municipalities, which is quite a positive result of the policy suggesting a reduction in 
the inequality. The big drawback for these municipalities though was the increase in pupil 
teacher ratio in almost all regions, showing a necessity to raise the number of teachers in 
public schools. It might be the case however that the reason why we observe an increase in 
the pupil teacher ratio is that teachers capture the rent  - the 60% of the budget being spent on 
teachers lead to a increase in the wages of teachers rather than an increase in the number of 
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teachers, which is not exactly a bad result given the lower salaries of public school teacher’s 
in Brazil. Finally the analysis on school inputs indicates a reduction in the inequality between 
poorer and richer areas. 
3.7.2 Student’s Test Scores 
 The previous section presented the effects of the reform on school inputs. Following 
the overall analysis of the educational policies, this section analyses whether the funding 
increase brought by the reform and the subsequent increase in teacher spending translated into 
higher students’ test scores.48    
As mentioned before, the impact of the reform over students’ test scores is not only 
contemporaneous but it is also a result of the years of continuing attendance to a public school 
with better resources. In order to measure the latter effect, the sample is restricted to students 
that have only attended public primary schools and that were born in the same municipality 
they currently live in. We have also created a variable which is simply the sum of all revenues 
received by the municipality during the period to account for the cumulative effect of 
educational inputs (Cunha et al, 2006). The assumption is that students from schools in 
municipalities that have received more resources during the period were more exposed and 
therefore might have been more positively affected by the policy.49  
Table 3.12 presents estimates for the first-stage regressions. Panels A, B and C show 
the first stage regressions for revenue per capita, Fundef intensity and total revenue per capita 
respectively. All F-statistics computed are higher than the critical values for weak instrument 
(Stock and Yogo’s (2005)). The instrument employed here is the same as the one employed in 
the schools inputs estimates.   
Tables 3.13a to 3.13c present the effects of the reform on test scores using three 
different policy measures. Table 3.13a show the results for standardized test scores using the 
contemporaneous revenue per capita for each region. For the Southeast and South region, the 
OLS and IV estimates show no effects. Column (3) and (4) in panel B indicates a negative 
and a positive effects for the North and Northeast regions respectively; however, the effects 
are rather small. Table 3.13b presents OLS and IV estimates for the FUNDEF intensity 
                                                          
48 According to the program rules, 60% of total FUNDEF revenue has to be spent on teacher’s wages. 
49 According to INEP (2011), the cumulative investment per public school student along the length of theoretical 
studies in 2011 was around R$21,703 ($9,650) for the lower primary level and R$17,605 ($7,825) for the upper 
primary (2013 US$). 
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variable. Column (1) in panel B shows that high treated municipalities in the Southeast region 
presented a decrease in their students’ test scores of around 0.12 standard deviation. Table 
3.13c presents the cumulative effect of the funding reform. The estimates show no effects for 
the first three regions (Southeast, South and North) and a positive but small effect for the 
Northeast region. The lack of substantive positive effect and the negative effect found in the 
Southeast region might be due to an influx of new students with poorer backgrounds. This 
however could also indicate that despite the incorporation of these students the policy were 
not able to increase the quality of their education. Thus, the estimates suggest that the increase 
in expenditure per pupil did not translate into a higher students’ mean performance at least in 
the period analysed. It should be noted however that we have a very limited data on test 
scores. The improvement on students’ test scores could be happening in first years of the 
reform as shown by Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2007), or at different points of the 
distribution. 
3.7.3 Education Attainment 
In this section, we focus on the effect of the reform on education attainment. As 
PNAD is not representative at the municipal level, FUNDEF impact is now evaluated at the 
State level. Given that, FUNDEF total revenue per capita is now the sum of the observed 
municipal revenue per capita plus the State revenue per capita, so the total revenue received 
from the fund is the sum of revenue received by the municipalities which is destined to its 
municipal schools plus the revenue received by the State which is destined to the state 
schools. In order to deal with the possible endogeneity of the observed State revenue per 
capita, we have also constructed an instrument based on simulated State revenues. Such 
instrument is based on the number of students enrolled in public schools in 1996. However, 
during the period analysed, there was a decline in the number of students enrolled in State 
schools. Since the majority of students from primary education had actually migrated to 
municipal schools as municipalities became the main responsible for the offer and 
management of primary education (while the State became responsible for the secondary 
education). This change can be seen in Figure 3.11, which shows the number of enrolments in 
all educational levels in State and Municipal schools. After 1997 there was a clear decrease on 
the number of students enrolled in State schools. There was also a large increase in the 
number of students enrolled in municipal schools during the period. 
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Therefore, the simulated revenue per capita based on the 1996 State enrolment rate 
actually overestimated some of the observed State’s revenues. The total revenue received by a 
State from the fund is the sum of the revenue received by its municipalities plus the revenue 
received by the State itself. The revenue received by municipalities goes to its municipal 
schools while the revenue received by the State goes to its state schools. Because the 
simulated State revenue actually overestimates the observed State revenue, the instrument for 
the total revenue is now based on the simulated municipal revenue plus the observed State 
revenue. This instrument is less subject to endogeneity, though, as State enrolment rates are 
far more difficult to manipulate since States have a great number of schools spread all over 
their territories. On the other hand, municipalities with a small number of schools have more 
power to manipulate their enrolment figures. The amount received from the fund by each 
State also depends on the amount of  taxes and revenues. However, not all taxes linked to 
fund are State taxes, in fact a great share of them are Federal taxes. Moreover the main State 
taxes linked to the fund (ICMS, IPVA and ITCMD) have their minimum and maximum 
values set by the Federal government. Municipals revenues also represent the large share of a 
State’s total FUNDEF revenue since the number of students enrolled in municipal educational 
system is much higher. All these facts together, suggest that our instrument is less subject to 
to endogeneity problems. 
Table 3.14 presents estimates for the first-stage regressions. Panels A and B show the 
first stage regressions for total revenue per capita and total revenue per capita interacted with 
State GDP per capita.  Both F-statistics computed are higher than the critical values for weak 
instrument (Stock and Yogo’s (2005)).  
Table 3.15 presents OLS and IV results for some educational outcomes. Column (1) 
presents the effects of the reform on the probability to attend secondary education. Despite the 
large increase in the proportion of children attending primary education, secondary education 
attendance is still an issue. The IV estimates indicate that a R$1000 rise in total revenue per 
pupil increases the probability to attend secondary school by 3 percentage points, which 
represents a 9% increase over the mean for municipalities in the bottom quintile of income 
per capita. Given the low attendance in secondary education this does not seem a great 
increase. Results also indicate a positive effect on the probability to complete primary 
education (Column 2): a R$1000 revenue per capita increase leads to a rise of 5 percentage 
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points in the probability to complete primary education for people aged 14 to 17 years old, 
which represents almost a 10% rise over the mean for the poorest municipalities. 
Column (3) shows the effects on the probability to complete secondary education for 
people aged 17 to 19.50 Again, the estimates indicate a greater effect for States with a lower 
GDP per capita. On average, a R$ 1000 increase in total revenue per capital is associated with 
a 4% points rise in the probability to complete secondary education. 
Column (4) shows the effects on completed years of schooling for individuals aged 15 
to 19 who were affected by the policy. Panel B shows effects only for the lower income 
States. The estimate indicates that a R$1000 increase in total revenue increase is associated 
with a 0.20 years of schooling increase for States in the first percentile of GDP per capita and 
0.1 for individual in the second percentile of GDP per capita. In other words, individuals aged 
15 to 18 completed 0.20 more years of schooling on the States most affected by the reform. 
The estimates thus show some evidence of a positive but a small effect of the reform on 
educational attainment variables. The effects seem to be concentrated on low income States, 
in fact the ones most affected by the reform. The inputs analyses also show that the reform 
had its greatest impact on poorer municipalities. Franco and Menezes-Filho (2010) also found 
some evidence of positive effect on student’s approval rate and a negative effect on the drop-
out rates for municipalities most affected by the reform. The lack of a substantive and a 
generalized effect on education attainment might reflect the absence of a more substantive and 
widespread effect on schools inputs and the absence of a positive effect on student´s test 
scores. It may also be driven by selection effect whereby post reforms, more poorer students 
stay in schools, affecting the average attainment. 
3.8 Conclusions 
Despite the substantial research in the field, the question of whether increasing 
funding for schools improves student performance remains controversial. Debates about how 
to improve the quality of public education often focus on whether governments should 
increase their spending per pupil.  As a result, this study aimed at contributing to the literature 
by evaluating the effects of a large educational funding reform in Brazil.  
                                                          
50 We consider that people with 19 years old were also affected because the average age in secondary school for 
the sample after 1998 was 18.3. 
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The educational funding reform implemented in Brazil (FUNDEF/B) largely increased 
education spending across country. One of the aims of the reform was to reduce the disparities 
in the allocation of resources within and among regions. Besides, by increasing the amount of 
resources allocated to public schools the reform also aimed at improving the quality of basic 
education. FUNDEF/EB policy intended at improving the distribution of education funding in 
order to reduce the large disparities in terms of school inputs and outputs between poor and 
rich regions. In the period analysed, the poorest regions (North and Northeast) have 
experienced a significant rise in their spending per pupil. This substantial increase suggests 
that the reform had, to a large extent, its expected effect.  
The empirical work in this chapter has indicated some results that are worth noting. In 
regards to school inputs, the estimation results suggest a decline in the inequality between 
poor and rich areas within regions. Overall, the effect of the reform on school inputs seemed 
to be greater for lower income municipalities, which is quite a desirable result of the policy. 
This effect could be seen as an important step towards reducing schools’ inequalities between 
poorer and richer areas. The results however indicate an increase in the pupil teacher ratio in 
almost all regions. This result could indicate that the increase in the number of teachers hired 
during the period was not enough to offset the influx on new students.  
The estimates show no link between educational expenditures and student’s test 
scores. As pointed out by Gordon and Vegas (2005) the reform greatly increase enrolment 
levels on poorer municipalities. This certainly increased the influx of students with poorer 
backgrounds on the educational system. However, besides that, the increase in education 
spending brought by the reform in the period was not able to increase the quality of student’s 
achievement. The results indicate that the increase in expenditure per pupil did not translate 
into a higher students’ performance in terms of standardized test score, at least in the period 
analysed. 
The results show some evidence of a small but positive effect on educational 
attainment. The effects seem to be concentrated on low income States, in fact the ones most 
affected by the reform. The estimates show some effect on the proportion of students 
attending secondary education and an increase on the probability to complete primary and 
secondary education in the most affected States. 
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FUNDEF/EB was certainly the major educational policy ever implemented in Brazil 
and which substantially increased funding to public schools. However, given the amount of 
resources destined to this policy in the last 16 years the effects on the Brazilian public 
education seems quite modest.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Table 3.1: Average Years of Schooling for the Adult Population, 1960-2010  
 
1960 1990 2000 2010 
Ratio 
2010/1990 
Ratio 
2010/1960 
Argentina  5.3 7.9 8.6 9.3 1.2 1.7 
Brazil  1.8 3.8 5.6 7.2 1.9 4.0 
Chile  5.0 8.1 8.8 9.7 1.2 1.9 
Colombia  2.8 5.5 6.5 7.3 1.3 2.6 
Mexico  2.6 5.5 7.4 8.5 1.5 3.3 
Peru  3.2 6.6 7.7 8.7 1.3 2.7 
Canada  8.1 10.3 11.1 11.5 1.1 1.4 
France  4.1 7.1 9.3 10.4 1.5 2.5 
United Kingdom  6.0 7.9 8.5 9.3 1.2 1.5 
USA  8.9 12.3 13.0 12.4 1.0 1.4 
China  1.4 4.9 6.6 7.5 1.6 5.2 
Japan  7.2 9.9 10.7 11.5 1.2 1.6 
Korea, Rep.  3.2 8.9 10.6 11.6 1.3 3.6 
OECD average  6.1 8.9 9.9 10.7 1.2 1.7 
Source: World Bank (2010)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics - School Census 
Variable 1997 2010 
Computer lab 0.01 
(0.06) 
 
0.38 
(0.35) 
Sport facilities 0.11 
(0.23) 
0.31 
(0.34) 
Science lab 0.02 
(0.11) 
 
0.05 
(0.13) 
Library 0.13 
(0.24) 
0.35 
(0.34) 
Running water 0.28 
(0.33) 
0.59 
(0.33) 
Electricity 0.61 
(0.37) 
0.95 
(0.15) 
Sewage 0.14 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.34) 
Principal’s office 0.21 
(0.29) 
0.65 
(0.32) 
Toilet inside the building 0.63 
(0.36) 
0.89 
(0.21) 
Proportion of teachers with a college degree 0.13 
(0.19) 
0.62 
(0.29) 
Pupil teacher ratio 21.22 
(7.25) 
17.90 
(4.98) 
                     Source: School Census. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics - School Census 
Variables    
 
 Southeast South North and Northeast Centre-West 
Fraction of municipal schools with a running water 0.59 0.59 0.33 0.57 
 (0.35) (0.36) (0.28) (0.35) 
Fraction of municipal schools with electricity 0.92 0.98 0.70 0.85 
 (0.18) (0.07) (0.32) (0.27) 
Fraction of municipal schools with sewage 0.53 0.17 0.07 0.09 
 (0.38) (0.27) (0.14) (0.20) 
Fraction of municipal schools with principal's office 0.51 0.50 0.28 0.52 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.28) (0.37) 
Fraction of municipal schools with toilet inside the building 0.90 0.93 0.67 0.80 
 (0.22) (0.15) (0.33) (0.28) 
School infrastructure I quality index, first PC from 2-factor PCA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 (1.74) (1.43) (1.65) (1.69) 
Fraction of municipal schools with a computer lab 0.16 0.22 0.05 0.17 
 (0.29) (0.33) (0.12) (0.30) 
Fraction of municipal schools with sport facilities 0.31 0.40 0.06 0.26 
 (0.34) (0.35) (0.11) (0.32) 
Fraction of municipal schools with a library 0.37 0.49 0.09 0.25 
 (0.36) (0.37) (0.15) (0.32) 
Fraction of municipal schools with a science lab 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.02 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.02) (0.07) 
School infrastructure II quality index, first PC from 2-factor PCA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 (1.54) (1.51) (1.44) (1.41) 
Fraction of primary teachers with a college degree – lower primary 0.42 0.43 0.17 
 
0.39 
  (0.33) (0.32) (0.25) (0.34) 
Fraction of primary teachers with a college degree – upper primary 0.72 0.71 0.43 0.59 
 (0.31) (0.28) (0.35) (0.34) 
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Data are aggregated over the 1997 to 2010 period and over municipalities for which data 
is  available (N=66,528). Source: School Census, STN, and IPEADATA 
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  Table 3.3 (continued): Summary Statistics - School Census 
Variables    
 
 Southeast South North and Northeast Centre-West 
Primary pupil teacher ratio – lower primary 18.4 15.2 24.5 20.65 
 (11.4) (7.1) (9.31) (10.05) 
Primary pupil teacher ratio – upper primary 14.6 10.1 16.7 14.70 
 (10,6) (6.9) (13.3) (10.61) 
Revenue per capita (100s, 2011 Reais) 7.23 7.02 8.07 6.62 
 (9.33) (12.9) (11.16) (7.34) 
Simulated revenue per capita (100s, 2011 Reais) 4.67 6.67 6.78 5.60 
 (5.49) (8.314) (7.13) (6.45) 
Education spending per capita (2011 Reais) 321.38 354.11 306.03 312.00 
 (329.07) (883.94) (834.36) (262.19) 
Intensity Fundef 0.098 -0.065 1.01 -0.015 
 (0.69) (0.61) (1.14) (0.77) 
Average income per capita (2011 Reais) 5902.21 6663.35 2408.64 6054.02 
 (7258.63) (6215.18) (3550.82) (5655.28) 
Population 37,455 22,818 28,303 22,220 
 (262,895) (78,365) (107,826) (76,052) 
Population aged 7 to 15 
 
Population aged 7-15 
6,039 3,749 5,631 3,945 
 (38,578) (11,888) (18,786) (12,446) 
 Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses. Data are aggregated over the 1997 to 2010 period and over municipalities 
for which data is available (N=66,528). Source: School Census, STN, and IPEADATA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics: Prova Brasil and Census 2010 - 8th grade 
Variables Southeast South North Northeast Centre-West 
Math test score 251.60 
(47.07) 
255.95 
(43.85) 
231.09 
(40.63) 
226.15 
(41.95) 
247.64 
      (43.48) 
Boy 0.47 
(0.49) 
0.47 
(0.50) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.46 
(0.50) 
White 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.28 
(0.45) 
Age 15.0 
(0.98) 
14.85 
(0.96) 
15.56 
(1.53) 
15.52 
(1.55) 
15.05 
(1.33) 
Failure before 0.28 
(0.45) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
0.34 
(0.47) 
Mother education - higher degree 0.11 
(0.31) 
0.10 
(0.29) 
0.10 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
Computer 0.59 
(0.49) 
0.60 
(0.49) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
0.43 
(0.49) 
Work 
 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
 Drop-out before : No 0.96 
(0.21) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
0.89 
(0.31) 
0.91 
(0.29) 
0.91/ 
(0.28) 
School age entry: 
Pre-school 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
Schools with cycle regime 0.66 
(0.47) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.16 
(0.36) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
Number of cars 0.59 
(0.72) 
0.81 
(0.74) 
0.19 
(0.48) 
 
0.18 
(0.45) 
0.53 
(0.66) 
Number of bedrooms 2.36 
(0.83) 
2.79 
(0.75) 
2.42 
 (0.93) 
2.52 
(0.84) 
2.58 
(0.78) 
Number of bathrooms 1.35 
(0.64) 
1.34 
(0.64) 
1.02 
(0.71) 
1.00 
(0.59) 
1.30 
(0.62) 
Child mortality rate 13.60 
(1.78) 
11.29 
(1.61) 
20.31 
(4.24) 
25.07 
(6.26) 
15.43 
(2.36) 
Illiteracy rate 5.08 
(3.46) 
4.12 
(2.49) 
12.46 
(6.82) 
23.50 
(8.65) 
7.33 
(3.80) 
Share of people with a degree - 25 over 14.49 
(6.76) 
11.47 
(6.43) 
5.55 
(3.83) 
4.59 
(3.75) 
11.44 
(5.63) 
Share of children vulnerable to poverty 33.59 
(11.42) 
26.54 
(13.67) 
66.82 
(15.24) 
76.76 
(12.18) 
37.05 
(12.70) 
 Unemployment rate 7.19 
(1.79) 
4.19 
(1.87) 
8.43 
(2.96) 
8.76 
(3.61) 
 
5.64 
(1.37) 
Share of the population living in a 
household with a toilet and running water 
96.43 
(4.15) 
96.83 
(3.04) 
58.41 
(21.54) 
66.81 
(19.81) 
93.33 
(6.68) 
Share of the population living with 
electricity 
99.81 
(0.69) 
99.78 
(0.34) 
92.06 
(8.85) 
96.86 
(4.80) 
98.79 
(3.69) 
Share of the population living with 
inadequate water supply and sanitation 
0.96 
(1.90) 
0.73 
(1.36) 
28.13 
(17.73) 
15.84 
(12.51) 
3.71 
(4.73) 
Share of householders mothers without 
primary education and at least one child 
younger than15 
14.0 
(4.43) 
15.07 
(5.40) 
26.17 
(8.67) 
25.66 
(8.93) 
16.24 
(7.31) 
Revenue per capita (100s, 2011 Reais) 18.13 
(8.32) 
17.52 
(8.29) 
16.56 
(7.35) 
18.11 
(6.41) 
15.80 
(5.76) 
Total revenue (1000s, R$2011) 9.90 
(5.25) 
9.00 
(5.10) 
 
7.74 
(3.74) 
8.84 
(4.10) 
8.46 
(3.72) 
Source: Prova Brasil and Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano do Brasil. Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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      Table 3.5: Summary Statistics – PNAD (1992-2011) 
Variables  
Attending primary education 0.844 
 (0.338) 
Years of schooling 3.906 
 (3.095) 
Attending secondary education  0.351 
 (0.430) 
Primary education – complete 0.470 
 (0.498) 
Secondary education – complete 0.215 
 (0.420) 
Boy 0.507 
 (0.499) 
White 0.475 
 (0.499) 
Age 12.985 
 (4.254) 
Work 0.211 
 (0.408) 
Lives with mother 0.847 
 (0.360) 
Mother education – less than primary education  0.782 
 (0.413) 
Mother education – less than high school  0.134 
 (0.341) 
Mother education – high school less than college 0.079 
 (0.269) 
Mother education – college 0.006 
 (0.073) 
Attending 9 years primary education 0.074 
 (0.261) 
Household income per capita (R$ 2011) 582.190 
 (961.47) 
Share of public schools with cycle regime 0.194 
 (0.301) 
Share of poor 0.202 
 (0.118) 
Share of people attending a private school 0.162 
 (0.053) 
State GDP per capita 6345.82 
 (2945.93) 
Population 6 to 18 313,201 
 (264,025) 
Revenue per capita (States + Municipalities) (100s, 2011 Reais) 9.47 
 (4.98) 
        Source: PNAD (1992-2011). Standard deviation in parentheses 
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Table 3.6a: IV First Stage Results - Schools Inputs 
       
Dependent 
Variable Per capita revenue 
 Southeast South North & Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2)         (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Simulated revenue 0.261*** 0.258*** 0.750*** 0.773*** 0.450*** 0.364*** 0.500*** 0.477*** 
 (0.054) (0.056) (0.043) (0.043) (0.021) (0.026) (0.046) (0.063) 
Simulated 
revenue*Income 
per capita – 1st   -0.047  -0.209***  0.135***  0.011 
  (0.079)  (0.023)  (0.017)  (0.074) 
Simulated 
revenue*Income 
per capita – 2sd    -0.048  -0.162***  0.092***  -0.020 
  (0.066)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.056) 
Simulated 
revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  0.090  -0.125***  0.074***  0.063 
  (0.064)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.049) 
Income per capita - 
First percentile -41.70 -28.28 -45.01*** 45.43*** -25.73* -89.57*** -36.55 -44.34 
 (36.18) (51.23) (13.00) (17.16) (13.76) (14.95) (29.37) (29.24) 
Income per capita - 
Second percentile -75.40** -59.99 -20.30* 46.04*** -2.94 -45.13*** 18.83 26.45 
 (34.62) (43.70) (10.91) (16.52) (12.67) (14.00) (22.04) (27.30) 
Income per capita - 
Third percentile -9.08 -36.15 -11.66 42.42*** 1.67 -33.54*** 21.48 -6.16 
 (24.71) (23.05) (7.83) (12.13) (11.13) (12.14) (17.76) (21.36) 
Population 0.039 0.037* 0.026 0.058 0.035 0.040 -0.167* -0.162* 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.043) (0.094) (0.092) 
7-15 population 0.074 0.071 -0.271** -0.331*** -0.242*** -0.267*** -0.445* -0.429* 
 (0.063) (0.061) (0.114) (0.107) (0.104) (0.131) (0.244) (0.240) 
Other municipal 
revenues 1.428 1.429 -0.002 -0.003 0.055 0.070 0.020 -0.005 
 (0.979) (0.982) (0.003) (0.003) (0.042) (0.046) (0.070) (0.067) 
         
N 15,706  13,818 13,818 20,253 20,253 4,957 4,957 
Municipalities 1348 1348 1114 1114 1891 1891 398 398 
F stat, Excluded 
Instruments 215.33 65.22 327.25 94.25 365.9 101.0 78.90 61.35 
 Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include municipality and year 
fixed effects, municipality specific effects, as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1 . 
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 Table 3.6b: IV First Stage Results - Schools Inputs 
     
Dependent Variable  
Per capita revenue*income per capita  
 Southeast South North&Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simulated revenue 1.276*** 3.168*** 1.985*** 2.434*** 
 (0.207) (0.176) (0.104) (0.253) 
Simulated revenue*Income per capita – 1st  -2.515*** -2.927*** -2.265*** -2.628*** 
 (0.252) (0.085) (0.066) (0.235) 
Simulated revenue*Income per capita - 2nd  -1.602*** -2.133*** -1.444*** -1.777*** 
 (0.217) (0.086) (0.065) (0.220) 
Simulated revenue*Income per capita - 3th -0.485** -1.256*** -0.626*** -0.733*** 
 (0.214) (0.076) (0.062) (0.203) 
Income per capita - First percentile -821.504*** -187.358*** -665.779*** -345.146*** 
 (169.436) (60.592) (54.649) (99.878) 
Income per capita - Second percentile -742.990*** -28.746 -432.641*** -152.480 
 (146.030) (58.415) (52.168) (95.082) 
Income per capita - Third percentile -444.722*** 47.302 -228.499*** -113.083 
 (81.311) (48.983) (46.719) (79.748) 
Population 0.136* 0.156 -0.272 -0.338 
 (0.076) (0.162) (0.343) (0.340) 
7-15 population 0.330* -0.421 -0.278** -1.372 
 (0.194) (0.462) (0.128) (0.953) 
Other municipal revenue 4.306 -0.010 0.305* 0.140 
 (3.187) (0.012) (0.177) (0.277) 
     
N 15,706 13,818 20,253 4,957 
Municipalities 1348 1114 1891 398 
F stat, Excluded Instruments  205.13 222.55 235.33 236.19 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include  municipality     
and year fixed effects, municipality specific effects as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1.   
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    Table 3.6c: IV First Stage Results - Schools Inputs 
  
Dependent Variable Intensity Fundef 
 Southeast South North&Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Simulated Intensity Fundef 0.521*** 0.551*** 0.555*** 0.927*** 
 (0.047) (0.114) (0.031) (0.032) 
Income per capita - First percentile 0.024 -0.072* -0.059 -0.135** 
 (0.077) (0.041) (0.047) (0.066) 
Income per capita - Second percentile 0.065 -0.014 -0.017 0.036 
 (0.080) (0.042) (0.042) (0.053) 
Income per capita - Third percentile -0.034 -0.012 -0.024 0.080** 
 (0.031) (0.026) (0.037) (0.040) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
7-15 population 0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Other municipal revenue 0.000** -0.000 0.000** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
N 15,175 13,423 19,649 4,752 
Municipalities 1348 1114 1891 398 
F stat, Excluded Instruments 822 1155 1583 633.4 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include   
municipality and year fixed effects, municipality specific effects as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary 
enrolment and primary enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1.  
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Table 3.7a: OLS and IV Results: Education Spending per capita 
Dependent Variable Education Spending per capita 
 
 Southeast South 
North & 
Northeast 
Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: OLS Results     
Revenue 0.205*** 0.189*** 0.351*** 0.109*** 
 (0.012) (0.030) (0.043) (0.014) 
Income per capita – 1st 
percentile -22.399** -11.555 -7.522 -19.188** 
 (11.164) (18.352) (10.725) (7.614) 
Income per capita – 2nd 
percentile -16.496 7.576 -14.544* -12.197** 
 (10.928) (8.122) (7.484) (5.664) 
Income per capita – 3th 
percentile 1.955 5.414 
-3.820 4.799 
 (4.106) (5.830) (4.992) (3.926) 
Population 0.002 -0.042 0.055 -0.095*** 
 (0.005) (0.035) (0.060) (0.035) 
7-15 population 0.041** 0.110 -0.086 -0.004 
 (0.019) (0.094) (0.090) (0.071) 
Other municipal revenue 0.127*** 0.013 0.013 0.045** 
 (0.039) (0.018) (0.055) (0.023) 
R2 0.901 0.769 0.666 0.915 
     
     
Panel B: IV Results     
Simulated Revenue 0.167*** 0.216*** 0.265*** 0.225*** 
 (0.028) (0.045) (0.100) (0.060) 
Income per capita – 1st 
percentile -22.604** -1.348 0.827 -10.053 
 (9.741) (19.393) (11.036) (8.153) 
Income per capita – 2nd 
percentile -12.399 6.170 -8.699 -7.570 
 (9.909) (8.496) (6.931) (6.314) 
Income per capita – 3th 
percentile -0.912 6.314 -2.935 3.455 
 (3.750) (6.145) (5.251) (4.488) 
Population 0.008*** -0.087** 0.075 -0.066* 
 (0.003) (0.036) (0.082) (0.040) 
7-15 population 0.043 0.221** -0.043** 0.042 
 (0.067) (0.094) (0.020) (0.084) 
Other municipal revenue 0.213 -0.031 0.130** 0.068 
 (0.231) (0.056) (0.056) (0.70) 
R2 0.880 0.687 0.556 0.873 
N 15,706 13,818 20,253 4,957 
Notes: Observed revenue is instrumented with simulated revenue. Clustered standard errors at the 
municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include a linear time trend interacted with 
1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and 
municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.10. 
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Table 3.7b: Minimum expending levels transfers 
Dependent Variable Education Spending per capita 
 
Centre-West North Northeast Southeast South 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(4) (5) 
OLS Results    
  
“Minimum spending level” transfers 0.042*** 0.250* 0.048*** 0.184*** 0.143*** 
 (0.009) (0.145) (0.011) (0.020) (0.049) 
Income per capita – 1st percentile -33.416** -60.122*** -25.425*** -30.581*** -3.488 
 (14.074) (18.943) (8.091) (11.092) (7.266) 
Income per capita – 2nd percentile -19.215 -15.566 -13.115** -32.218*** 2.119 
 (14.529) (18.513) (5.724) (10.576) (5.879) 
Income per capita – 3th percentile 6.611 3.388 -7.918** -2.419 3.290 
 (4.387) (7.133) (3.426) (4.118) (4.122) 
Population -0.098** -0.055** 0.010 -0.000 -0.007 
 (0.048) (0.026) (0.010) (0.005) (0.025) 
7-15 population -0.067 0.098 -0.104** 0.044*** 0.048 
 (0.067) (0.156) (0.049) (0.015) (0.069) 
Other municipal revenue 0.009 0.106 0.018 0.167*** -0.002 
 (0.043) (0.347) (0.040) (0.039) (0.003) 
      
R2 0.868 0.489 0.659 0.887 0.904 
N 15,175 13,423 19,649 4,752 15,175 
Notes: Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include year and municipality   
fixed effect as well as municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.10.  
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Table 3.8a: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index - Centre-West 
Dependent Variable Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality 
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality         
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality 
Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue -0.004 -0.003  0.008* 0.021***  
 (0.003) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.005)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 1st  -0.010*   -0.002  
  (0.006)   (0.007)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 2sd    -0.002   -0.006  
  (0.005)   (0.006)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 3th  0.000   -0.044***  
  (0.004)   (0.010)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.024   0.113*** 
   (0.021)   (0.036) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.054*** -0.066***  0.040*** 0.053***  
 (0.007) (0.008)  (0.011) (0.010)  
Simulated revenue*Income per capita -
1st   0.054***   -0.031***  
  (0.006)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income per capita - 
2sd   0.034***   0.002  
  (0.006)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income per capita - 
3th   0.003   -0.022**  
  (0.006)   (0.011)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -0.064*   0.084 
   (0.036)   (0.056) 
       
N 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 
Municipalities 398 398 398 398 398 398 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  Clustered 
standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, population age 7 
to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment squared, year and 
municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, 
population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * 
indicatesp<.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8b: OLS and IV Results: Proportion of Teachers with a Degree  - Centre-West  
Dependent Variable Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree –
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
upper primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue -0.001 0.000  0.000 -0.000  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 1st  0.004**   0.003*  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 2nd  -0.002   0.002  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 3th  -0.003**   -0.001  
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.003   -0.000 
   (0.006)   (0.006) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.007*** -0.005***  -0.003 -0.006***  
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 1st  0.002   0.012***  
  (0.003)   (0.002)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 2sd   0.000   0.011***  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  -0.007***   -0.001  
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   0.007   0.009 
   (0.008)   (0.010) 
       
N 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 
Municipalities 398 398 398 398 398 398 
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Table 3.8c: OLS and IV Results: Pupil Teacher Ratio - Centre-West  
Dependent Variable Pupil teacher 
ratio – lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – upper 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – upper 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – upper 
primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue -0.059 -0.078  0.040 0.046  
 (0.047) (0.055)  (0.060) (0.060)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
1st 
 0.263***   -0.001  
  (0.066)   (0.050)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
2nd  0.041   0.019  
  (0.050)   (0.066)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
3th  -0.043   -0.040  
  (0.068)   (0.075)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.053   0.598* 
   (0.251)   (0.346) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.207*** -0.337***  -0.112 -0.094  
 (0.064) (0.063)  (0.071) (0.068)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 1st  0.472***   0.072  
  (0.070)   (0.079)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 2sd   0.257***   0.116  
  (0.058)   (0.074)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  0.060   -0.079  
  (0.071)   (0.080)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -0.019   0.236 
   (0.316)   (0.411) 
       
N 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 4,469 
Municipalities 398 398 398 398 398 398 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, 
population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
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Table 3.9a: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index - South 
Dependent Variable Infrastructure 
I 
Quality Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality 
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.003** 0.004***  0.004* 0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 1st  -0.007   0.027***  
  (0.005)   (0.006)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 2sd    -0.006   0.026***  
  (0.004)   (0.006)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 3th  -0.003   0.010*  
  (0.004)   (0.006)  
Fundef Intensity   0.015   0.075* 
   (0.021)   (0.043) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.002** -0.001**  0.006** 0.005**  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita -1st   0.034***   -0.006  
  (0.004)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita – 2sd   0.015***   0.001  
  (0.005)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita – 3th   0.014***   0.004  
  (0.005)   (0.007)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -0.038   0.164*** 
   (0.045)   (0.052) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, 
population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
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Table 3.9b: OLS and IV Results: Proportion of Teachers with a Degree - South  
Dependent Variable Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree – 
lower 
primary 
Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree - 
lower 
primary 
Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree - 
lower 
primary 
Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree - 
upper 
primary 
Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree - 
upper 
primary 
Proportion 
of teachers 
with a 
degree - 
upper 
primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.000 -0.000  0.001** 0.001***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
1st  0.006***   0.000  
  (0.001)   (0.002)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
2nd  0.002**   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
3th  0.003***   0.002*  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.007   0.003 
   (0.004)   (0.005) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.000 0.000  0.001* 0.001  
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 1st   0.007***   0.005**  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 2sd   0.005***   0.007***  
  (0.002)   (0.003)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  0.004***   0.005***  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -0.042***   -0.060*** 
   (0.011)   (0.020) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same 
covariates.  Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP 
per capita, population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary 
enrolment and primary enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates 
p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
Table 3.9c: OLS and IV Results: Pupil teacher ratio - South  
Dependent Variable Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- upper 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- upper 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- upper 
primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.001 -0.023*  0.171** 0.127***  
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.067) (0.049)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
1st  0.194***   0.646***  
  (0.037)   (0.223)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
2nd  0.165***   0.516***  
  (0.037)   (0.106)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
3th  0.112**   0.392**  
  (0.035)   (0.106)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.085   2.835*** 
   (0.194)   (0.711) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.002 -0.003  0.019 0.001  
 (0.015) (0.007)  (0.017) (0.005)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 1st   0.325***   -0.001  
  (0.047)   (0.004)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 2sd   0.298***   0.274**  
  (0.041)   (0.15)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  0.182***   0.167**  
  (0.042)   (0.11)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -2.165***   -1.375** 
   (0.427)   (0.88) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, 
population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * 
indicates p<.1
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Table 3.10a: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index – Southeast 
Dependent Variable Infrastructure 
I 
Quality Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality 
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.004*** 0.009***  -0.008** -0.027***  
 (0.001) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.007)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 1st  -0.010***   0.028***  
  (0.003)   (0.007)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 2sd    -0.003   0.024***  
  (0.003)   (0.007)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 3th  -0.005*   0.022***  
  (0.003)   (0.006)  
Fundef Intensity   0.008   -0.069** 
   (0.013)   (0.031) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.005*** -0.014***  -0.003 -0.021***  
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.008)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita -1st   0.088***   -0.026***  
  (0.008)   (0.008)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita – 2sd   0.039***   0.021***  
  (0.004)   (0.008)  
Simulated revenue*Income per 
capita – 3th   0.022***   0.027***  
  (0.003)   (0.007)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -0.065   -0.033 
   (0.020)   (0.040) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, 
population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
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Table 3.10b: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index – Southeast 
Dependent Variable Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with a 
degree -  
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree - 
upper primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue -0.000 -0.003***  0.001** 0.002**  
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 1st  0.007***   0.001  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 2sd    0.007***   0.000  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 3th  0.004***   -0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Fundef Intensity   0.007   0.026*** 
   (0.004)   (0.003) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.004** 0.001  0.001* -0.001  
 (0.002) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.002)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita -1st   0.014***   0.027***  
  (0.004)   (0.004)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita – 2sd   0.006***   0.000  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita – 3th   0.004**   0.002**  
  (0.002)   (0.001)  
Simulated Fundef 
Intensity   0.019***   0.002 
   (0.008)   (0.005) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, 
population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
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Table 3.10c: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index – Southeast 
Dependent Variable 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio- lower 
primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue -0.039* -0.178***  0.011 0.087  
 (0.020) (0.053)  (0.016) (0.066)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
1st  0.368***   -0.041  
  (0.128)   (0.078)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
2sd    0.162**   -0.206**  
  (0.080)   (0.097)  
Revenue*Income per capita - 
3th  0.146***   -0.084  
  (0.053)   (0.063)  
Fundef Intensity   0.351   1.373*** 
   (0.450)   (0.484) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.281*** -0.477**  -0.097 -0.188  
 (0.050) (0.206)  (0.080) (0.120)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita -1st   1.420***   0.339***  
  (0.521)   (0.140)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 2sd   0.464***   0.067  
  (0.203)   (0.138)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th   0.249**   0.151*  
  (0.125)   (0.081)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   -1.164***   1.883*** 
   (0.553)   (0.650) 
       
N 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 29,682 
Municipalities 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 2461 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, 
population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * 
indicatesp<.1
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Table 3.11a: OLS and IV Results: Infrastructure I and Infrastructure II Quality Index – North and Northeast 
Dependent Variable Infrastructure 
I 
Quality Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
I 
Quality 
Index 
 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality 
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
Infrastructure 
II 
Quality  
Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.002 0.001  -0.011* -0.012  
 (0.002) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.007)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 1st  0.002   -0.003  
  (0.002)   (0.006)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 2sd  0.002   0.000  
  (0.002)   (0.006)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 3th  -0.000   0.002  
  (0.003)   (0.005)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.013   0.010 
   (0.008)   (0.019) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.040*** 0.037***  -0.075*** -0.017  
 (0.005) (0.006)  (0.015) (0.019)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita -1st  0.007**   -0.053***  
  (0.003)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 2sd  -0.000   -0.055***  
  (0.003)   (0.007)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  -0.002   -0.051***  
  (0.003)   (0.006)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   0.109***   -0.288*** 
   (0.022)   (0.069) 
       
N 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 
Municipalities 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, 
population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment 
squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
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Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, 
population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * 
indicatesp<.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.11b: OLS and IV Results: Pupil Teacher Ratio – North and Northeast 
Dependent Variable Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree –  
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree –  
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree –  
lower primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree –  
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
upper primary 
Proportion of 
teachers with 
a degree – 
upper primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.002** 0.000  0.001 0.001  
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 1st  0.002**   0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 2nd  0.002***   -0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Revenue*Income per 
capita - 3th  0.001   -0.001  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.002   -0.003 
   (0.003)   (0.003) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue -0.001 0.003***  0.017*** 0.016***  
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita - 1st   -0.008***   0.000  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita - 2sd  -0.004***   -0.000  
  (0.002)   (0.002)  
Simulated 
revenue*Income per 
capita – 3th  -0.001*   0.002**  
  (0.001)   (0.001)  
Simulated Fundef 
Intensity   -0.021***   0.018** 
   (0.005)   (0.009) 
       
N 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 
Municipalities 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 
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Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  
Clustered standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, 
population, population age 7 to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary 
enrolment squared, year and municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * 
indicates p<.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.11c: OLS and IV Results: Pupil Teacher Ratio – North and Northeast 
Dependent Variable 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – lower 
primary 
Pupil 
teacher ratio 
– lower 
primary 
Pupil 
teacher ratio 
– lower 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – upper 
primary 
Pupil teacher 
ratio – upper 
primary 
Pupil 
teacher ratio 
– upper 
primary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: OLS Results       
Revenue 0.259*** 0.041  0.070 0.092  
 (0.071) (0.069)  (0.073) (0.075)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 1st  0.505***   0.069  
  (0.060)   (0.068)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 2nd  0.351***   0.047  
  (0.051)   (0.045)  
Revenue*Income per capita 
- 3th  0.186***   0.092  
  (0.058)   (0.075)  
Fundef Intensity   -0.624***   0.093 
   (0.177)   (0.181) 
       
Panel B: IV Results       
Simulated revenue 0.528*** 0.021  -0.168** -0.365***  
 (0.086) (0.082)  (0.082) (0.098)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 1st   0.482***   0.188***  
  (0.081)   (0.080)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita - 2sd  0.519***   0.109*  
  (0.067)   (0.057)  
Simulated revenue*Income 
per capita – 3th  0.410***   0.211***  
  (0.066)   (0.09.1)  
Simulated Fundef Intensity   0.770***   -0.300 
   (0.266)   (0.328) 
       
N 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 20,253 
Municipalities 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 1891 
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Table 3.12: IV First Stage Results – Math Test Scores 8th grade 
      
Dependent Variable Per capita revenue 
Panel A Southeast South North Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Simulated revenue 10 0.664*** 0.673*** 0.481*** 0.358*** 
 
(0.077) (0.003) (0.125) (0.034) (0.087) 
      
N 469,634 123,696 79,368 429,458 53,941 
F stat, Excluded Instruments 25.15 28.0 24.61 19.38 17.15 
      
Dependent Variable Fundef Intensity 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Simulated Fundef Intensity 0.716*** 0.869*** 0.620*** 1.099*** 1.231*** 
 
(0.063) (0.034) (0.028) (0.174) (0.281) 
      
N 469,634 123,696 79,368 429,458 53,941 
F stat, Excluded Instruments 21.22 24.55 20.81 19.90 18.88 
      
Dependent Variable Total per capita revenue 
Panel C (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Simulated total per capita revenue 0.356*** 0.879*** 0.294*** 0.400*** 0.279*** 
 
(0.085) (0.059) (0.100) (0.024) (0.047) 
N 469,634 123,696 79,368 429,458 53,941 
F stat, Excluded Instruments 29.35 25.33 27.91 27.35 38.35 
Municipalities 637 380 209 1573 202 
Notes: Observed revenue and its interactions are instrumented with simulated revenue and its interactions with the same covariates.  Clustered 
standard errors at the municipality-year level in parentheses. All specifications include municipal GDP per capita, population, population age 7 
to 15, other municipal revenues, a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary enrolment and primary enrolment squared, year and 
municipality fixed effect and municipality specific effects. *** indicates p<.01; ** indicates p<.05; * indicates p<.1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Table 3.13a: OLS and IV Results - Student’ test scores 8th grade 
      
Dependent Variable Math Test Scores 
 Southeast South North Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: OLS Results      
Revenue -0.001 -0.000*** 0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Panel B: IV Results      
Simulated revenue -0.008 -0.000*** -0.009** 0.011*** 0.009 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) 
      
N 469,634 123,696 79,368 429,458 53,941 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include student’s and 
municipal controls, municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary 
enrolment and primary enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1  
 
 
Table 3.13b: OLS and IV Results - Student’ test scores 8th grade 
      
Dependent Variable Math Test Scores 
 Southeast South North Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: OLS Results      
Fundef intensity -0.012 -0.047** 0.015*** -0.000 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.004) (0.001) (0.007) 
      
Panel B: IV Results      
Simulated Fundef 
intensity 
-0.121*** -0.036 0.011 0.001 -0.018 
 (0.041) (0.027) (0.016) (0.002) (0.016) 
      
N 469,634 123,696 79,368 429,458 53,941 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include student’s and 
municipal controls, municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 primary 
enrolment and primary enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1  
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Table 3.13c: OLS and IV Results - Student’ test scores 8th grade 
      
Dependent Variable Math Test Scores 
 Southeast South North Northeast Centre-West 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: OLS Results -0.006* 0.001* 0.004 0.012*** -0.014* 
Total revenue per capita (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) 
      
      
Panel B: IV Results      
Simulated total revenue  -0.037 0.001 -0.014 0.021*** 0.016 
 (0.081) (0.002) (0.021) (0.007) (0.022) 
      
N 255,848 65,227 47,670 239,187 28,628 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the municipality-year level. All specifications include student’s 
and municipal controls, municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects, as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 
primary enrolment and primary enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1  
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          Table 3.14: IV First Stage Results – Educational Attainment  
  
Panel A  
Dependent Variable Total per capita revenue 
  
Simulated total revenue per capita 0.476*** 
 (0.047) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita -1st  -0.230*** 
 (0.046) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita – 2sd  -0.195*** 
 (0.054) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita – 3th  -0.060 
 (0.039) 
  
N 1,128,391 
F stat, Excluded Instruments  38.96 
  
Panel B  
Dependent Variable Total per capita revenue*State GDP per capita 
  
Simulated total revenue per capita 2.359*** 
 (0.288) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita -1st  -3.043*** 
 (0.190) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita – 2sd  -2.209*** 
 (0.185) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per capita – 3th  -1.035*** 
 (0.164) 
  
N 1,128,391 
F stat, Excluded Instruments  103.4 
      Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the state-year level. All specifications include 
individual and state controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state specific effect as well as a linear time trend 
interacted with 1996 primary/secondary enrolment and primary/secondary enrolment squared. *** indicates 
p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates p<0.1  
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Table 3.15: OLS and IV Results: Educational Attainment Outcomes   
Dependent Variable Attending 
secondary 
Education 
Primary 
Education - 
Complete 
Secondary 
Education - 
Complete 
 
Years of schooling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: OLS Results    
 
Total Revenue 0.002* 0.002 0.001 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Total Revenue*GDP per capita - 1st 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 0.026*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Total Revenue*GDP per capita - 2sd   0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.018** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) 
Total Revenue*GDP per capita - 3th 0.002** 0.002** 0.001 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
     
Panel B: IV Results 
 
   
Simulated total revenue 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per 
capita -1st  
0.003* 0.005** 0.004*** 0.020** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per 
capita – 2sd  
0.003** 0.003 0.004*** 0.012* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) 
Simulated total revenue*GDP per 
capita – 3th  
0.002** 0.002* 0.001 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) 
 
 
   
N 335,601 255,040 314,433 333,709 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the state-year level. All specifications include individual and state 
controls, state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state specific effect as well as a linear time trend interacted with 1996 
primary/secondary enrolment and primary/secondary enrolment squared. *** indicates p<0.01, ** indicates p<0.05, * indicates 
p<0.1  
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Figure 3.1: Education Expenditures per pupil as Share of GDP per capita 
 
Source: INEP 
Figure 3.2 Municipal Spending on Education as a Share of municipal GDP - by regions 
 
Source: STN and IPEADATA 
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Figure 3.3 Municipal Expenditure per Pupil by regions (Constant 2011 R$) 
 
Source: STN and INEP. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Real Spending on Education per Pupil - Municipalities in the top quartile of GDP per 
capita 
 
Source: STN and IPEADATA 
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Figure 3.5 Real Spending on Education per Pupil - Municipalities in the bottom quartile of GDP 
per capita 
 
Source: STN and IPEADATA. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Net and Gross enrolment rate - Primary Education 
 
Source: PNAD 
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Figure 3.7: Percentage of students performing below proficiency Level 2 in reading in 2000 and 
2009 
 
Source: OECD - PISA, 2009. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Percentage of students performing below proficiency Level 2 in mathematics 2003 and 
2009 
 
Source: OECD - PISA, 2009. 
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Figure 3.9: Intensity of FUNDEF reform on municipalities by regions (1998-2010) 
 
Source: Finbra (Tesouro Nacional) 
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Figure 3.10: Intensity of FUNDEF reform on municipalities by percentiles (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th) 
of income per capita (1998-2010) 
 
Source: Finbra (STN). 1=First percentile; 2=Second percentile; 3=Third percentile; 4=Fourth percentile. 
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Figure 3.11: Enrolment rate Municipal and State schools (1,000s)  
 
Source: School Census  
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APPENDICES 
A APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A.1: Percentage of enrolment considered in each education level - FUNDEF/FUNDEB 
Education Level 1998-2006 2007 2008 From 2009 
Pre-primary education - 1/3 2/3 3/3 
Primary education 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 
Primary education (Youth and Adults) - 1/3 2/3 3/3 
Secondary Education - 1/3 2/3 3/3 
Ministry of Education, 2008. 
 
Table A.2: Weighing factor - FUNDEF/FUNDEB 
Education Level 1997-1999 2000-2004 2005-2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Public day care - Full time - - - 0.80 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Public day care - Part time - - - 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Pre-primary - Full time - - - 0.90 1.15 1.20 1.25 
Pre-primary - Part time - - - 0.90 0.90 1.00 1.00 
Lower primary – Urban 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Lower primary – Rural 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.15 
Upper primary – Urban 1.00 1.05 1.05 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10 
Upper primary – Rural 1.00 1.05 1.07 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.20 
Primary Education - Especial1 1.00 1.05 1.07 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 
Primary Education - Full time - - - 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Secondary Education - Urban - - - 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 
Secondary Education - Rural - - - 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 
Secondary Education - Full time - - - 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 
Education Level - Youths and 
Adults 
- - - 0.70 0.70 0.80 0.80 
Education Level - Youths and 
Adults (professional education) 
- - - 0.70 0.70 1.00 1.00 
Ministry of Education, 2008. 1For children with special needs. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
According to Barro (1996), economic growth rate is positively related to schooling. 
In the OECD area, one additional year of education is estimated to increase economic 
output by 3 to 6% (OECD, 2005). Improving educational achievement is a policy priority 
in most countries, with policymakers looking for greater effectiveness and efficiency in the 
education system.  
As pointed out by Card (1999), education plays a central role in modern labour 
markets. However, despite the extensive availability of data on individual’s schooling and 
income, the literature has not yet reach a consensus on the magnitude of the causal effect 
of education on earnings.  
In the second chapter we aimed at identify regions of returns to schooling in the 
UK using Manski (1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000) non-parametric bounds. This 
approach has the advantage to rely on relatively weak and somewhat testable assumptions. 
The estimates show evidence that the returns to education computed using non-parametric 
bounds are smaller than some of the point estimates usually reported in the literature, 
which usually assume somewhat stronger assumptions. This is especially true for higher 
qualifications. 
Debates about how to improve the quality of public education often focus on 
whether governments should increase education expenditures. The effects of school 
resources on students’ outcome are rather controversial since there is no consensus in the 
literature about whether increasing school resources improves student achievement.  
Little is known about how effective expenditures are at increasing pupil’s 
performance and attainment. A crucial policy matter is, therefore, whether an increase in 
per pupil expenditure is able to improve students’ outcomes. The key question is, thus, 
whether higher spending translates into student achievements. Identifying the impacts of a 
higher per pupil spending on educational performance is crucial since it is directly related 
to the formulation of efficient public policies within the realm of limited resources. 
The education funding reform implemented in Brazil (FUNDEF/B) changed the 
structure of public education funding and was responsible for a large increase in education 
spending. One of the major goals of the reform was to reduce the large disparities within 
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and across states, with the ultimate goal of reducing inequalities in terms of students’ 
achievements. Discuss the effects of such a reform is to discuss the issue “Does money 
matters for education?” 
 In regards to school inputs, the estimation results suggest a decline in the 
inequality between poor and rich areas within regions. Overall, the effect of the reform on 
school inputs seemed to be greater for lower income municipalities, which is quite a 
desirable result of the policy. This effect could be seen as an important step towards 
reducing schools’ inequalities between poorer and richer areas.  
The estimates show no link between educational expenditures and student’s test 
scores. As pointed out by Gordon and Vegas (2005) the reform greatly increase enrolment 
levels on poorer municipalities. This certainly increased the influx of students with poorer 
backgrounds on the educational system. However, besides that, the increase in education 
spending brought by the reform in the period was not able to increase the quality of 
student’s achievement. The results indicate that the increase in educational expenditure did 
not translate into a higher students’ performance in terms of standardized test score, at least 
in the period analysed. As discussed earlier the literature shows no definite link between 
education spending and student learning. In the United States, real spending per student 
more than tripled between 1960 and 2000, but students’ performance on standardized tests 
have remained quite flat (Hanushek, 2003). Chile has also increased its spending on 
education in the last years, in an attempt to largely improve school quality. Despite that the 
results for Chilean students on international examinations have remained quite constant. 
(OECD, 2010).  
The results show some evidence of a small but positive effect on educational 
attainment. The effects seem to be concentrated on low income States, in fact the ones 
most affected by the reform. The lack of a substantive and a generalized effect on 
education attainment might reflect the absence of a more substantive and widespread effect 
on schools inputs and the absence of a positive effect on student´s test scores. It may also 
be driven by selection effect whereby post reforms, more poorer students stay in schools, 
affecting the average attainment. 
The big question remains though, is there a link between education expenditure and 
school quality? Maybe what the result shows is that higher levels of expenditure per pupil 
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does not necessarily increases the quality of education that one receives. Maybe what 
matters most is not directly the amount of money available, but how it is managed and how 
efficiently it is spent and combined with other practices that could support learning. 
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